



Transmission of Monetary Policy and Bank Heteroge-
neity in Colombia 
Carolina Ortega Londono, Diego Restrepo Tobón 
Transmission of Monetary Policy and
Bank Heterogeneity in Colombia
Carolina Ortega Londoño ∗†‡
Supervisor: Diego Restrepo Tobón, Ph.D§
June, 2018
Abstract
This study provides evidence of bank heterogeneity in Colombia
for the period 2002-2014 and analyzes how bank-specific character-
istics determine the bank-lending channel for monetary policy. To
analyze bank heterogeneity, this study estimates technical (cost) effi-
ciency using Stochastic Frontier Analysis, which also allows for the
measurement of Returns to Scale and a Lerner Index to proxy mar-
ket power in the loans market. This study also provides measures
of capitalization, liquidity, and the commonly used ratios of financial
and operational efficiency with bank’s balance-sheet data. Further-
more, using a long and unbalanced panel, this study finds evidence of
the existence of a bank-lending channel and finds that this transmis-
sion mechanism is determined by bank-specific characteristics. The
results suggest higher technical and operational efficiency, capitaliza-
tion, liquidity and market power, increase the sensitivity of loans dis-
bursements to monetary policy shocks, while higher returns to scale
lowers this sensitivity.
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Most central banks follow an inflation targeting strategy and monetary
policy is implemented through their main policy instrument, the bench-
mark interest rate for intervention in the money market. There are differ-
ent mechanisms in which changes in this rate translate into changes in real
economic variables and inflation, that are referred to as the transmission
channels of monetary policy. The traditional transmission channel of mon-
etary policy is the interest rate channel (Mishkin, 1996), but the literature
has found other mechanisms. One of the alternative mechanisms of trans-
mission of monetary policy through the banking sector is known as the
credit channel, which is divided into two different mechanisms. One of
them is known as the balance-sheet channel and the other one as the bank
lending channel. The former is related to information asymmetries in the
capital market and the latter relates directly to the banking sector and the
credit market (Gómez-González & Grosz, 2007).
In a very simple manner, the balance-sheet channel (also known as the
flight to quality channel) results when, because of asymmetries of informa-
tion between lenders and borrowers, if there is, for example, a contractive
monetary policy, the value of borrowers’ collateral decreases and so the
willingness of lenders to supply loans to these agents is reduced (Black &
Rosen, 2007). On the other hand, to understand the bank-lending channel
consider a contractive monetary policy where, for example, bank deposits
are reduced and capital reserves decrease too. Then, banks face a short-
age of funding and must look for alternative resources to keep up with the
lending levels. If these other sources of funding are scarce, it is likely that
they will be more expensive, so marginal cost of lending will rise and banks
will have to reduce their credit supply to the economy (Gómez-González
& Grosz, 2007).
Therefore, it becomes clear that the banking sector has an active role in
the transmission of monetary policy and the question of how particular
characteristics of this sector affect the transmission mechanism of mone-
tary policy is relevant, as has been shown in previous literature (Kashyap
& Stein, 1995, 2000; Black & Rosen, 2007; Kishan & Opiela, 2000; Jayaratne
& Morgan, 2000; Brissimis & Delis, 2010). Furthermore, if the bank lend-
ing channel works by affecting the supply of loans because of changes to
the cost of lending, then banks’ cost structure (which is related to the effi-
ciency of banks) could determine how this mechanism of transmission of
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monetary policy works (Jonas & King, 2008). And, if more efficient banks
can translate a contractionary change in the policy instrument faster than
inefficient banks can, for example, bank efficiency and its determinants are
important on determining the power and efficacy of monetary policy, and
policymakers should take this into account when defining regulations that
could seem unrelated (such as regulation on bank size, capitalization, mar-
ket power, risk requirements, etc).
This study assesses if there is evidence of a bank-lending channel for Colom-
bia, and if this mechanism of transmission of monetary policy is hetero-
geneously determined by bank-specific characteristics, namely efficiency,
returns to scale, capitalization, liquidity and market power. First, a theo-
retical model of industrial organization of the banking sector is presented
to motivate how the cost structure of banks could heterogeneously deter-
mine the transmission of monetary policy. Then, the empirical approach is
in two steps, using monthly balance-sheet data of Colombia’s banks from
2002 to 2014, provided by the Financial Supervisor of Colombia, SFC (Su-
perintendencia Financiera de Colombia).
In the first step of the empirical methodology, seven measures of bank
heterogeneity are calculated. The first measure of heterogeneity is tech-
nical (cost) efficiency, using Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA). Technical
efficiency is related to the ability of banks to produce at their optimal level
and particularly cost efficiency, is related to the ability to choose the opti-
mal input quantities given input prices and output quantities (Kumbhakar
& Lovell, 2003). With the SFA approach, a trans-log production function
for banks is assumed, and a cost function is estimated, so it is possible to
calculate returns to scale (RTS) (which is the second measure of heterogene-
ity) and the marginal cost of loans. With this latter variable and balance-
sheet information from banks, this study estimates bank and time-specific
Lerner indexes for the loans market (the third measure of heterogeneity).
The other four measures of heterogeneity, namely capitalization, liquidity,
financial efficiency and operational efficiency, are calculated using balance-
sheet data from banks.
In the second step of the empirical approach, the heterogeneity measures
are used to model the growth rate of total (the sum of commercial, con-
sumer and micro-credits) disbursements, the sum of commercial and con-
sumer disbursements, and commercial and consumer disbursements in-
dividually, using changes in the interbank overnight rate (TIB), macroeco-
nomic and other controls, and the interaction of the previously estimated
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bank-specific characteristics with changes in the TIB rate. The TIB rate is
considered a proxy for monetary policy because it i s highly correlated with
the policy rate (TIP).
The findings of this study are twofold. The first is related to heterogeneity
in the banking sector in Colombia, and the second, to the heterogeneous
transmission of monetary policy through the banking sector. Mainly, there
is statistically significant evidence of technical inefficiency in Colombia’s
banks (around 70.13%) and it depends positively on bank’s size, liquidity,
capitalization and negatively on credit risk. Also, there is evidence of the
existence of a bank-lending channel for Colombia, and of a heterogeneous
transmission of monetary policy determined by bank-specific characteris-
tics. Higher more efficient banks (considering the technical efficiency and
operational efficiency measures) and banks with higher market power, liq-
uidity, and capitalization, reduce the growth-rate of disbursements faster
after a monetary policy shock. On the other hand, higher returns to scale
are related to lower sensitivity of disbursements to monetary policy shocks,
and financial efficiency does not seem to affect the bank-lending channel (it
is not statistically significant).
The results of this study are generally aligned with previous literature on
efficiency and heterogeneous transmission of monetary policy through the
bank-lending channel, with slight differences. Moreover, some of the het-
erogeneity measures that were considered had not been broadly studied or
included at all in previous literature, particularly for the Colombian case.
Then, this study contributes valuable evidence, not only for the literature
on monetary policy and the bank-lending channel but also for the efficiency
literature and the better understanding of the banking industry in Colom-
bia, for local policymakers.
This study is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 of this study include
the problem statement and justification for studying this topic and its im-
portance. Section 4 presents the literature review of monetary policy trans-
mission, studies on the bank-lending channel and heterogeneity of banks,
the studies that have been done for Colombia in this topic, and the last
section dedicated to bank efficiency. Section 5 and 6 present the data and
descriptive statistics respectively. Section 7 presents the methodological
approach and a motivating theoretical model for the bank-lending channel




The Board of Directors of Colombia’s central bank has a constitutional man-
date to ”control inflation, to keep it low and stable, being consistent with a general
economic policy” (Banco de la República, 2018a), which consists of a maxi-
mization view of employment and economic growth. To do so, the central
bank follows an inflation targeting strategy and monetary policy is imple-
mented through their main policy instrument, the benchmark interest rate
for intervention in the money market. Anyhow, there are different mecha-
nisms in which changes in this rate translate into changes in real economic
variables and inflation, that are referred to as the transmission channels of
monetary policy. Thus, it is of great importance for central banks to under-
stand how these channels work and how their regulatory decisions affect
them.
The traditional transmission channel of monetary policy is the interest rate
channel. Through the bonds market, changes in the benchmark rate (short-
term rate) translate into changes in the long-term rates (along the term
structure of interest rates), which in turn impact aggregate demand (Mishkin,
1996). Furthermore, the literature has found that monetary policy also im-
pacts nominal variables, such as loan supply from banks and loan demand,
and this amplifies the effect of monetary policy on the real economy. Previ-
ous studies have identified two channels in which monetary policy is trans-
mitted to the economy through the banking sector (a mechanism known as
the credit channel). One of them is known as the balance-sheet channel and
the other one as the bank lending channel. The former is related to infor-
mation asymmetries in the capital market and the latter relates directly to
the banking sector and the credit market (Gómez-González & Grosz, 2007).
In a very simple manner, the balance sheet channel results when, because
of asymmetries of information between lenders and borrowers, if there is,
for example, a contractive monetary policy, the value of borrowers’ collat-
eral decreases and so the willingness of lenders to supply loans to these
agents is reduced. Thus, this transmission mechanism is also known as
the ”flight to quality” channel (Black & Rosen, 2007). On the other hand,
to understand the bank lending channel consider a contractive monetary
policy where, for example, bank deposits are reduced and capital reserves
decrease too. Then, banks face a shortage of funding and must look for al-
ternative resources to keep up with the lending levels they have acquired
already. If these other sources of funding are scarce, it is likely that they
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will be more expensive, so marginal cost of lending will rise and banks
will have to reduce their credit supply to the economy (Gómez-González
& Grosz, 2007).
Therefore, it becomes clear that the role of the banking sector in the trans-
mission of monetary policy is an active one and the question of how par-
ticular characteristics of the banking sector, such as liquidity, capitalization
and market power, affect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy
is relevant. Furthermore, if the bank lending channel works by affecting
the supply of loans because of changes to the cost of lending, then banks’
cost structure (which is related to the efficiency of banks) could determine
how this mechanism of transmission of monetary policy works. Addition-
ally, if more efficient banks can translate a contractionary change in policy
instrument, for example, faster than inefficient banks can, then bank effi-
ciency and its determinants are important on determining the power and
efficacy of monetary policy.
Finally, it is important for policymakers to understand the mechanics of
monetary policy transmission through the banking sector and consider
bank-specific characteristics to propose regulatory changes that could seem
unrelated to monetary policy, such as regulation on bank size, capitaliza-
tion, liquidity or financial conglomerates. Also, central banks should try
to understand the mechanism of transmission of monetary policy through
financial intermediaries, to align banking regulation so that they can pro-
mote financial stability and their main goal (inflation targeting) can be com-
pleted in an effective manner.
This study assesses if there is evidence of a bank-lending channel for Colom-
bia, and if this mechanism of transmission of monetary policy is hetero-
geneously determined by bank-specific characteristics, such as efficiency,
returns to scale, capitalization, liquidity and market power.
3. Justification
How monetary policy is transmitted is one of the main concerns of central
banks because the effectiveness of their interventions depends on it. Also,
banks play a critical role in the economy as matchers of resources through
the credit market and the deposit market. If substitutes of loans or deposits
through this traditional channel are scarce and costly (so the Modigliani-
Miller theorem is not met), then a monetary policy shock could have an
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amplified effect on economic variables because of a transmission mecha-
nism through the banking sector. This transmission channel is known as
the credit channel, and it is important for policymakers to understand how
it works because otherwise, they could be setting policies that have un-
wanted results on the effectiveness of the monetary policy instruments.
The way the credit channel works must be understood considering two dif-
ferent mechanisms. First, the balance sheet channel works because of the
information asymmetries in financial markets, where problems of moral
hazard and adverse self-selection are present (Black & Rosen, 2007). Sec-
ond, the bank lending channel works because of the way a shock to the
policy instrument affects the cost of resources that banks use to offer loans
to the public. A change in the policy instrument is likely to be transmit-
ted almost immediately to the interbank or money market, which is liquid
and where risk is at its lowest (so market rates follow the policy rate very
closely). Also, this shock affects the value of bank deposits, so the liquid-
ity a bank has available to commit to loans will be affected. If it is not able
to find other loanable resources without incurring higher costs, then loan
supply will vary (Gómez-González & Grosz, 2007).
Previous literature has extensively documented how the bank lending chan-
nel depends on different bank characteristics. Mainly, the literature has
showed bank size, capitalization levels and market structure are hetero-
geneous characteristics of banks that affect monetary policy transmission
particularly through the bank lending channel or the balance sheet chan-
nel (Ciccarelli, Maddaloni & Peydró, 2013; Baglioni, 2007; Kashyap & Stein,
2000; Kishan & Opiela, 2000; Bluedorn, Bowdler, Koch & others, 2017; Bris-
simis & Delis, 2010). Anyhow, there are still some features that are at the
core of the credit market that have not received enough attention such as
bank efficiency (Jonas & King, 2008). The capability of a bank to adapt
to changes in the gap between its funding costs and revenues from lend-
ing, how their cost structure is affected by a change in the policy rate and
how they can transfer these changes through their loans supply, is at the
core of the mechanics that work for the bank-lending channel to have an
effect. Thus, bank-specific characteristics such as bank efficiency, market
structure (and market power), capitalization and liquidity could be affect-
ing the bank-lending channel.
Also, the channels of monetary policy transmission in Colombia have been
studied previously, especially since the central bank changed its strategy to
inflation targeting and adopted the benchmark interest rate as their main
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policy instrument in 2001. Anyhow, there is not a lot of evidence of the role
of specific characteristics of banks in the transmission of monetary policy,
especially for the efficiency of the banking sector. Furthermore, since there
have been changes in banking regulation in recent years, and the indus-
try has been adapting to Basilea III standards (which could have effects on
bank-specific characteristics such as capitalization, liquidity and technical
efficiency), this topic is worth studying.
4. Literature Review
4.1. Monetary Policy Transmission
In general, Central Banks use monetary policy with different objectives
such as controlling inflation, increasing economic growth or decreasing
unemployment. Central banks are not able to influence the objective macroe-
conomic variables directly, so they must rely on different instruments that
they can control directly which, through the monetary policy transmission
channels, will affect the targeted macroeconomic variables.
As Huertas, Jalil, Olarte, Romero & others (2005) explain, in practice, cen-
tral banks set different monetary goals (operative and intermediate goals)
that are achievable in the short run and will contribute directly to the mone-
tary policy objective. Operative goals must be set on variables that central
banks can control directly, that can be measured fast and with precision
and that have predictable effects on the main objective, for example, the
monetary base or short-run interest rates. On the other hand, intermedi-
ate goals are set on variables that they cannot control, but that also affect
the objective variables directly, such as a monetary aggregate, long-run in-
terest rates, and loans balances. Finally, policy instruments are variables
controlled by the central bank that influence operative goals directly and
intermediate goals indirectly, such as limits to interest rates, direct loans,
bank reserves and open market operations.
Anyway, how monetary policy (or changes in the operative goals) con-
tribute to achieving the monetary policy objective (impacting macroeco-
nomic variables) is a question that central banks need to answer to ensure
their policy decisions are efficient and effective. It is this question that mo-
tivates the study of monetary policy transmission channels.
The idea that financial intermediaries’ role in the transmission of monetary
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policy was an active one, began to strengthen when several authors ques-
tioned the application of the Modigliani-Miller theorem after the Great De-
pression. This theorem asserts that in the presence of perfect capital mar-
kets (with complete information), the real economy is sterile to the presence
of banks or financial intermediaries. But, as Bernanke & Gertler (1995) ex-
plain, if there are frictions in the capitals market, such as incomplete in-
formation, the financial market will have significant effects on the real al-
location of resources, given that banks enhance available information in
that market. Furthermore, these authors show that specific characteristics
of the financial intermediaries, such as asset allocation, the risk assumed
by banks and costs of monitoring, also affect intermediation (affecting real
economic variables eventually).
Bernanke & Blinder (1988) first introduced the idea of a credit channel of
monetary policy transmission when they proposed a variation of the IS-LM
(Investments-Savings and Liquidity Preferences-Money Supply) model, that
let changes in credit supply and demand have independent effects on ag-
gregate demand, so that both bank assets and liabilities had different roles
on the transmission of monetary policy. Later, Bernanke & Blinder (1992)
also showed that shocks to the Federal Funds rate have significant effects
on the real economy through a credit channel, so real macroeconomic vari-
ables are not sterile to central bank’s decision. When there is a contractive
policy, banks reduce their securities holdings and even though they do not
reduce current positions on loans, they reduce disbursements of new loans,
reducing the supply of loans and affecting aggregate demand. Later, the
literature has considered the definition of the credit channel proposed by
Bernanke & Gertler (1995). A shock in the monetary policy affects banks’
loans allocation through this channel, which at the same time is divided
into two channels: the balance sheet channel and the lending channel.
To understand the balance sheet channel, consider the information asym-
metries present in the lending market (moral hazards and adverse selec-
tion). Banks must rely on information from balance sheets and income
statements from their borrowers, but changes in the interest rate levels af-
fect the value of their assets and cash flows, making them attractive or not
for banks to be willing to take risks by lending them. Thus, this situation
could result in banks changing their supply of loans.
Furthermore, the bank-lending channel is the mechanism by which mone-
tary policy affects aggregate demand through bank loans. To understand
this channel, consider a contractionary monetary policy which decreases
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the value of banks’ liabilities or deposits, so the cost of lending is increased
for banks if they cannot replace deposits with other loanable funds with-
out incurring in higher costs. Thus, banks would have to raise interest rates
on loans. Moreover, if borrowers are not able to replace loans with other
sources of funding also without incurring in higher costs, they will have
to reduce consumption and investment, so aggregate demand would be
affected and the transmission completed. In summary, when a change in
monetary policy reduces deposits, loanable funds are reduced and new
loans can only be supplied at a higher rate, resulting in changes in the loans
supply that impact the real economy. This is known as the lending channel
(Brissimis & Delis, 2010).
The credit channel has been studied widely1, especially for the case of the
United States and the Euro area but also for Colombia. Several studies
have shown that the presence of the lending and balance sheet channels
amplifies the effect monetary policy on real GDP, and this is an idea that
is now widely accepted (Kashyap & Stein, 1995; Ciccarelli et al., 2013; Cic-
carelli, Maddaloni & Peydró, 2015; Black & Rosen, 2007; Hülsewig, Mayer
& Wollmershäuser, 2006).
4.2. Bank Lending Channel and Bank Heterogeneity
The relationship between bank heterogeneity and the transmission of mon-
etary policy has been studied for different characteristics of banks, mainly
size, capitalization, liquidity, market structure and market power. As will
be shown, there is little evidence in the literature on the relationship be-
tween monetary policy transmission and bank efficiency.
Kashyap & Stein (1995) proposed an extension of Bernanke & Blinder’s
(1992) theoretical model of bank portfolio behavior. With this model, they
support the hypothesis that capital market’s imperfections generate a bank
lending channel for the transmission of monetary policy. Also, they test
their model with cross-sectional predictions that show how these imper-
fections have heterogeneous effects on banks’ allocation of loans and secu-
rities, depending on their size in the United States. To do so, they distribute
1The literature has identified other channels for the transmission of monetary policy.
The traditional transmission mechanism is the interest rate channel, where increases of
the monetary policy rate are incorporated by the term structure of real interest rates and
aggregate demand is affected. Other channels are the exchange rate channel, the expec-
tations channel and the asset price channel (Gómez, Molano, Campos, Botia & Sanchez,
2016).
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banks for each time period by asset size. Then, they regress the variations
of net loans of each category, on changes in the monetary policy indica-
tor, the Fed Fund’s rate, and other macroeconomic controls, and take the
sum of the coefficients of the monetary policy indicator and its lags, as the
total impact of monetary policy on net loans. Their results suggest that
conditions for the existence of a bank lending channel are met and that
a contractionary policy reduces more loan allocation of small banks than
larger banks.
A differentiated impact of monetary policy on loans of small and large
banks was also studied, more recently, by Black & Rosen (2007). Using data
for the United States, they can identify the two mechanisms of the credit
channel, the bank-lending, and the balance -sheet channel. Since they can
identify totally new loans from new loans allocated with previously com-
mitted terms, they use this information to distinguish a change in loans
from the supply and demand side. Their results suggest that a contrac-
tionary monetary policy generates a reallocation of loans to shorter matu-
rities and increases loan repayment, which eventually reduces total loan
supply. Interestingly, they find that the impact is higher for large banks
than for small banks, contrary to what other studies have found.
Also, Kashyap & Stein (2000) studied heterogeneous response to mone-
tary policy through the bank-lending channel using a big data set for the
United States from 1976 to 1993, and considering not only size but also
liquidity of banks (measured as the ratio of securities to assets). In this
study, they extend their 1995 paper following a similar empirical strategy.
First, they built bank categories according to size, and later, they estimate
cross-sectional differences of the response of loan allocation among these
classes. To account for heterogeneity due to liquidity differences, they use
a two-stage and a direct estimation methodology. In the two-stage estima-
tion, they regress changes in loans for each class of banks on the level of
liquidity for each group, and then, they regress the coefficient estimated
for liquidity on lags of the monetary policy shocks. The direct estimation
regresses changes in loans on liquidity, monetary policy shocks, and inter-
actions between these two. Their results show that the impact of a change
in the policy instrument on the growth of loans is higher for the least liquid
banks, and especially for small banks.
Capitalization is another specific characteristic that has been shown to be
significant for the bank lending channel. Kishan & Opiela (2000) test loan
supply shifts due to a monetary policy shock in the United States, segregat-
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ing banks by size and the capital leverage ratio, supporting their empirical
strategy on a representative bank theoretical model. They use data from
banks’ balance sheets from 1980 to 1995 and estimate loan equations for
the growth rate of different types of loans for each size-capital category
of banks. Their results suggest that size and capitalization affect a bank’s
ability to replace loanable funds when there is a monetary policy shock, so
small banks with low levels of capitalizations react more to these shocks.
Also, Jayaratne & Morgan (2000) show evidence of the existence of a lend-
ing channel because of frictions present in the market for bank debt, so the
magnitude of the channel is higher for small under-capitalized banks that
are more prone to these frictions.
Brissimis & Delis (2010) argue that the importance of size on explaining the
differentiated response of changes in lending, following a monetary policy
shock, is not because of size per se, but because it is related to market power.
Thus, they test if the lending channel works heterogeneously depending on
liquidity, capitalization and market power of banks in the United States and
the Euro area, using data from 1994 to 2007. For their empirical strategy,
they use the local generalized method of moments (LGMM) to estimate
a dynamic panel data model, where the specification to test the lending
channel is based on an equation for the change of loans, depending on the
policy shock and interactions with bank’s characteristics. The results of
this study provide evidence of the heterogeneity of the bank lending chan-
nel depending on liquidity, capitalization and market power, showing that
banks with stronger balance sheets and market power take advantage of
monetary policy shocks.
Baglioni (2007) not only considers the heterogeneity of the banking sector
from capitalization differences, but he also analyses the effect of different
market structures on the transmission of monetary policy from a theoret-
ical perspective. In his study, he proposes a theoretical model to analyze
the impact of a monetary policy shock (measured by changes on the pol-
icy interest rate) on the market for bank loans, where well-capitalized and
under-capitalized banks are present. He models the interaction between
these types of banks under two market structures, monopolistic compe-
tition, and a Cournot oligopoly. The theoretical model suggests that the
propagation of a monetary policy shock is dependent on the market struc-
ture. Under the monopolistic competition approach, the impact of mon-
etary policy on banks decision is higher, meanwhile, under the oligopoly
approach, the impact is weaker. Also, the model suggests that the aggre-
gate impact of monetary policy on loans will be reduced by the presence
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of more under-capitalized banks.
Moreover, it is worth noting other studies that have provided evidence
of heterogeneous response of banks to monetary policy shocks. Bluedorn
et al. (2017) provide evidence of the existence of the lending channel de-
pending on heterogeneous characteristics of banks, and suggest using other
measures of monetary policy for the United States, different from the Fed
Fund Rate because it could be endogenous. Additionally, there are other
studies that extend the work of Kashyap & Stein (1995, 2000). Gamba-
corta (2005) shows that the results of previous literature on the relation-
ship between the bank lending channel with capitalization and liquidity
hold for Italy, but size does not seem to be related. Ehrmann, Gamba-
corta, Martı́nez-Pagés, Sevestre & Worms (2001) generalize these results
for the Euro area and they are also tested for Germany (Mueller-Spahn &
others, 2008). Also, Cetorelli & Goldberg (2012) show that globalization of
the banking sector in the United States also matters because internal cap-
ital markets of global banks weaken the lending channel. Thus, monetary
policy shocks lose impact on loan supply if banks are globalized. Further-
more, Loutskina (2011) shows securitization in the United States weakens
the power of monetary policy to affect loan supply.
Finally, the literature on the relationship between monetary policy trans-
mission and bank efficiency has not been studied widely before. To my
knowledge, only Jonas & King (2008) have explicitly addressed this issue.
In their study, they analyze how the bank lending channel is affected by
bank efficiency, specifically, cost efficiency. As they explain, new technol-
ogy is likely to have reduced cost inefficiencies because of the tools that are
now available to reduce information asymmetries in the loans markets, so
this may have affected the power of monetary policy. Also, the argument
behind their study is that, if a bank is more efficient (considering the costs
approach), then the supply of loans of an efficient bank would be less steep
than that of an inefficient one because the average costs of increasing loan
supply would be lower for the former. Then, if there is a shock derived
from a contractionary monetary policy intervention, for example, the cost
curve would shift to the left and the efficient bank would show a higher
reduction of supply. Furthermore, the efficient bank is likely to be able to
reduce risk exposure to risky clients faster.
Using data from 1984 to 2005 from bank’s balance sheets in the US, Jonas &
King (2008) follow the methodology proposed by Kashyap & Stein (1995).
First, they estimate a cost efficiency trans-log function through stochas-
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tic frontier analysis. Then, they use this information to segregate banks
into efficiency and size categories and estimate the variation of aggregate
loans from each group as a function of the policy rate. They find growth
rate of net loans responds differently among categories and conclude that
more efficient banks, transmit faster to their loan supply a monetary policy
shock and the effect is not symmetrical for contractionary and expansion-
ary policies. Thus, they conclude that increases in the policy rate produces
a higher decrease in loans than the increase that an expansionary policy
shock produces. Anyhow, this study makes simplistic assumptions and
does not consider that this differentiated response may also be affected by
market structure.
4.3. Monetary Policy Transmission in Colombia
To better understand the transmission of monetary policy in Colombia and
what has been studied before, it must be understood first how monetary
policy works in Colombia.
The Board of Directors of Colombia’s Central Bank (Banco de la República
de Colombia), has a ”constitutional mandate to keep inflation low and stable, in
coordination with a general economic policy” (Banco de la República, 2018a).
To do this, the bank has set an inflation targeting strategy2, meaning that
the main monetary policy objective is to control inflation, also promoting
the maximization of employment and economic growth. In 1999 Colom-
bia began to consolidate this strategy by establishing a flexible exchange
rate system (leaving behind an exchange rate band regime) and in 2001
the inflation targeting strategy was consolidated. The Central Bank set the
long-term inflation objective to 3% and in 2002, it was established that the
bank would announce a long-term inflation range target, and since then, it
has been set to 2-4%.
In practice, the Board of Directors meets at least once a month on a publicly
announced schedule and analyses the most relevant macroeconomic in-
formation, such as inflation expectations, economic growth, employment
and financial stability, to decide the path of monetary policy. The main
policy instrument that is used to implement this policy is the benchmark
interest rate for intervention in the money market. The central bank is con-
stantly supplying or withdrawing liquidity from the economy through dif-
2The inflation target is set on consumer price inflation, which is measured by the yearly
variation of the Consumer Price Index (IPC).
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ferent market operations in the money market at the benchmark interest
rate so that the interbank overnight interest rate follows the benchmark
rate closely.
The transmission channels of monetary policy have been studied for the
Colombian case3. Gómez-González & Grosz (2007) find evidence of a di-
rect bank-lending channel for Colombia and Argentina. Specifically, for
Colombia, they find that a positive shock to the monetary policy instru-
ment has a negative impact on commercial loan’s growth rate. Addition-
ally, their results suggest that the effect is heterogeneous across banks,
because bank-specific variables such as capitalization and liquidity, het-
erogeneously affect the cost of funding when the value of core deposits
(those that provide stable loanable resources such as current and savings
accounts) are affected.
Furthermore, Amaya (2005) finds evidence of a credit channel for Colom-
bia but he considers the effect of monetary policy on interest rates (specif-
ically those of the credit and deposits market) rather than on loans stock
or growth. He finds that credit rates have a stronger reaction than deposit
rates to a monetary policy shock and concludes loan quality and banks
operational costs are relevant determinants of interest rates in the credit
market. Other studies support these findings examining the effect of mon-
etary policy on different interest rates of the credit and deposits market
in Colombia. For instance, Melo-Velandia & Becerra-Camargo (2006) and
Huertas et al. (2005) find evidence of heterogeneous pass-through effect of
a monetary policy shock to the DTF and TIB rates footnoteThe DTF rate is
the average rate of 90-day time deposits agreed during the previous week
in the Colombian market, and the TIB is the interbank rate, that represents
the interest rate payable on over-night loans between banks.. Also, another
study suggests that the transmission of monetary policy to credit rates is
complete after 8 months in Colombia (Chavarro-Sanchez, Cristiano-Botia,
Gomez-Gonzalez, González-Molano, Huertas-Campos & others, 2015).
Another transmission mechanism through the banking sector that has been
studied for the Colombian case is the risk-taking mechanism, which con-
siders bank’s definition of loan supply as a function of the risk they are
willing to take. López, Tenjo & Zárate (2011) use a model of hazard func-
tion to estimate the effect of a monetary policy change, as measured by
3Table 8, in Annex A, summarizes the studies on monetary policy transmission for
Colombia that are mentioned in this section.
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the inter-bank rate, on commercial loans through the banks’ willingness
to bear risks. They find larger banks face lower risk in their portfolio and
that the more dependent a bank is on the interbank market for loanable
funding, the higher the risk rate on their portfolio.
4.4. A deeper look into Bank Efficiency
As it was shown in section 4.2, the literature suggests that the existence of
a credit channel, especially the bank lending channel, depends on the exis-
tence of differentiated funding costs for banks to constitute new loans and
that bank heterogeneity is an important determinant of the way this chan-
nel works. Thus, heterogeneous characteristics among banks, and most
importantly those that directly affect the cost of lending, may be key deter-
minants of how monetary policy is transmitted to commercial banks and
to the real economy. Thus, it is also important to understand how differ-
ent structures of banks and their use of resources, i.e. efficiency, affect the
mechanism that defines banks’ loan supply (Jonas & King, 2008) and the
setting of spreads (Das & Kumbhakar, 2012).
The efficiency of the banking sector is a topic that has been studied largely.
Berger & Humphrey (1997) surveyed 130 studies on the efficiency of the
financial sector that comprise 21 countries and that used parametric and
non-parametric frontier analysis to measure efficiency. They point out that
the purpose of most studies was to test regulatory effects on the banking
sector, assess methodological issues or analyze managerial performance,
but also that results are not consistent across the literature. Furthermore,
Berger & Mester (1997) considered almost 6,000 US banks over the period
of 1990-1995 and estimated different measures of efficiency, i.e. cost, stan-
dard profit and alternative profit efficiency, using different methodologies,
finding average cost efficiency was around 77%. They found that differ-
ences across the literature could be due to the differences in the definition
of efficiency and its modeling, but that these differences were little when
estimating average industry efficiency and firms’ rankings. Other studies
from the 90’s also estimated scale and scope economies and X-efficiency,
which is the common term in the literature for the efficient use of inputs
(Mester, 1996), and the importance of assumptions on common production
functions across firms was established (Altunbaş & Chakravarty, 1998).
More recently, the literature has studied different measures of efficiency
depending on the question they are addressing. For instance, many have
focused on the effect of banking regulation on the efficiency of the indus-
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try. To test if bank size should be regulated, Restrepo-Tobón, Kumbhakar
& Sun (2015) use a non-parametric approach that does not make assump-
tions on the functional form of technology to measure economies of scale
in the United States banking industry. They find evidence of substantial
economies of scale in large banks (over $1 billion in assets), even though
the top one hundred banks seem to have exhausted them. Thus, they sug-
gest bank consolidation and growth should continue in the US.
Also, Badunenko & Kumbhakar (2017) analyze a change in regulation in
India (the liberalization of banks ownership) on the returns to scale, tech-
nical efficiency and cost efficiency of banks owned by privates, foreigners
and the state, using a heteroscedastic four-component model from 1992
to 2009. They find that technology is heterogeneous depending on owner-
ship types and that regulation also affects returns to scale, technical change
and efficiency differently. In general, they find publicly owned banks op-
erated closer to their cost frontier than foreign and private banks. Another
study tested the same issue in India and found that publicly owned banks
operated above their efficient scale from 1996 to 2005 (Das & Kumbhakar,
2012). Additionally, the effect of liberalization on the efficiency of the bank-
ing industry in 1996 was also studied for Taiwan using a non-parametric
approach (DEA), but in this case, privatization was found to be positive for
the efficiency of the industry (Chen & Yeh, 2000). The effect of deregulation
on efficiency was also studied for the Spain case from 1986 to 1995, where
results showed technical inefficiency was affected at first but productivity
growth improved (Kumbhakar, Lozano-Vivas, Lovell & Hasan, 2001).
Furthermore, other changes in regulation have also been studied. For ex-
ample, the effect of labor regulations on the efficiency of the banking sec-
tor was studied by Mamatzakis, Tsionas, Kumbhakar & Koutsomanoli-
Filippaki (2015) for the European Union from 2005 to 2010. They find
that allocative efficiency is positively affected by labor market liberaliza-
tion policies, but they are not conclusive regarding technical efficiency.
Moreover, there have been concerns on the effects of heterogeneities across
firms on efficiency estimates. Triebs, Saal, Arocena & Kumbhakar (2016)
find evidence of the need to consider different technologies across firms
when estimating economies of scale and scope. They use a model that
allows for flexible technology across firm types and test their theoretical
approach with an empirical application to US local government-owned
electric utility firms. Additionally, Malikov, Restrepo-Tobon & Kumbhakar
(2014) study the presence of economies of scale in Credit Unions of the US
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that offer different financial products, and find evidence of technological
heterogeneity among firms that must be accounted to reach un biased es-
timates of efficiency.
Another topic that has been addressed in the literature is the effect of tech-
nological change and financial innovations on efficiency. First, Mishkin
& Strahan (1999) established that advances on information technologies
would affect the structure and efficiency of financial intermediaries be-
cause of the reduction of transaction costs and information asymmetries
(which result on moral hazard and adverse selection and thus, inefficient
selection of product mix of banks). Additionally, recent technological ad-
vances and deregulation of the sector have paved the way for different
strategies to generate profit, such as off-balance sheet (OBS) activities, which
have become more common. On this regard, Lozano-Vivas & Pasiouras
(2014) estimate changes in productivity due to OBS activities for 712 banks
in 84 countries, from 1999 to 2006. They found OBS is relevant in explaining
profit increases, and that profit productivity increases with this financial
innovation, especially for advanced countries.
The efficiency of the Colombian banking industry has also been studied.
Herrera, Bernal & others (1983) where the first to estimate a cost function
derived from a Cobb-Douglas production function (using OLS), for com-
mercial banks in Colombia in 1981. They found evidence of economies
of scale and a decreasing cost function. Later, Ferrufino & others (1991)
included other financial intermediaries (financial corporations – FC - and
corporations for savings and mortgages - CAV) in the estimation of a trans-
logarithmic cost function using OLS. She found that CAV also had decreas-
ing cost functions and showed scale economies, but the FC’s showed con-
stant average costs, suggesting the level of production was optimal. Fur-
thermore, technical efficiency and X-efficiency was estimated for Colombia
for the first time by Suescún, Misas & others (1996). They also estimated
scale economies for the Colombian bank industry between 1989 and 1995
and found that average inefficiency was 30.8% of total operative costs, of
which 85% was due to X-inefficiency, although it should be noted that they
did not include financial costs, which accounts for about 66% of total costs
(Janna Gandur, 2004).
Up until 2003, all other studies for efficiency for the Colombian banking
industry only estimated efficiency in relation to other banks (Castro, 2001;
Badel, 2002) meaning there was the assumption that one bank was indeed
efficient (Janna Gandur, 2004). Subsequent studies tried to overcome this
19
weakness and estimated absolute efficiency using parametric methodolo-
gies. Janna Gandur (2003) used stochastic frontier analysis to measure cost
efficiency for the banking sector in Colombia, from 1992 to 2002. He found
that average cost inefficiency was around 34% but that, over time, efficiency
rose 17 percentage points. Estrada (2004) also estimated absolute efficiency
for Colombia’s banks from 1989 to 2003 using stochastic frontier analysis
and a trans-log function, but found average inefficiency was lower, 28%.
The most recent literature on efficiency for the Colombian case has ex-
tended methodological rigor, the use of both parametric and non-parametric
techniques, and the inclusion of heterogeneous information of banks. Almanza-
Ramı́rez (2012) estimates cost efficiency (including scale, technical and al-
locative efficiency) of 15 banks in Colombia between 1997 and 2007, using a
non-parametric technique (Data Envelopment Analysis – DEA). He found
average cost efficiency was around 75.9% and inefficiency was mostly due
to allocative inefficiency (19.3%).
Also, Fernández & Estrada (2013) estimated X-efficiency of credit establish-
ments in Colombia from 2002 to 2014, estimating a Cost Stochastic Frontier
with a trans-log function of 2 outputs and 3 inputs (they also implement
a semi-parametric approach, Order-m, to test for robustness). Their study
suggests technical efficiency has increased over time in Colombia’s bank-
ing sector, except for a decrease in efficiency observed between 2008 and
2010, due to macro-prudential policies set in 2007. They find an average ef-
ficiency level of 51.6% and a level of 60.3% in June 2012. They explain that
their estimates may be biased downward around 10% because of missing
variables for some banks. Furthermore, they analyze the relationship be-
tween efficiency and market structure conditions, and they find that mar-
ket concentration is negatively related to efficiency, so it is possible that the
most concentrated banks have fewer incentives to reduce costs since their
market power lets them obtain satisfactory profits (compared with the rest
of the market).
More recently, Sarmiento, Cepeda, Mutis & Pérez (2014) estimated dif-
ferent measures of efficiency using the non-parametric DEA approach for
commercial banks in Colombia, from 2000 to 2009, which let them study
the effects of the financial crisis of 2008. They found that technical effi-
ciency improved gradually (except in 2008 due to external forces). Aver-
age technical efficiency for the period of study was 79.03% but it showed
high heterogeneity among banks. Anyway, the literature’s agenda on effi-
ciency for the Colombian sector seems to be focused on the effect of merg-
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ers and acquisitions (M&A), due to the high number of foreign banks en-
tering the industry. For instance, Sarmiento & Galan (2014) use stochastic
frontier analysis to estimate efficiency and identify the effects of risk-taking
on bank’s performance for Colombia for the period 2002-2012, specifically
considering the role of bank’s size and if it has been involved in a M&A pro-
cess. They find that higher capitalization leads to greater profit and cost
efficiency and that foreign large banks, involved in M&A processes, profit
more from credit risk than local, small banks, which do so from market
risk.
5. Data
The data used in this study consists of an unbalanced panel, with monthly
data from 2002 to 2014, for 34 banks (of which 13 are present for the whole
time-period). Banks’ data on balance-sheets and disbursements is taken
from the Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia, SFC, which is the public
supervisor of the financial sector. The time period is limited because of
three reasons. First, as the Inflation Targeting policy was adopted in 2001,
the dynamics of monetary policy transmission would have to be studied
with a different approach before this date. Second, banks are required to
report their balance-sheet information to the supervisor under a different
accounting rule since 2015 4, so data after 2015 is not comparable directly.
Third, the SFC only reports monthly information on total disbursements
by banks since May 2002.
Also, the panel includes data from 34 banks that operated from 2002 to
2014 but not necessarily throughout the whole time-frame. 13 banks be-
gun to operate before 2002 and were still functioning in 2014, 7 banks that
were still open in 2014, begun to operate between 2009 and 2011. Also, 8
banks that were operating in 2002, were liquidated or absorbed in 2005 or
2006, and 3 more also stopped operating between 2013 and 2014. The bank
with fewer observations in the panel, Granbanco S.A., operated from 2005
to 2007. 6 banks were removed from the database because they had little
information available (due to the quality of information reported or time
operating). This information was complemented with SFC reports of all
bank events (mergers, acquisitions, liquidations, change of names, among
others). Also using this data, a dummy variable to report when a bank ac-
4Before 2015, accounting information had to be reported under PUC (Plan Único de
Cuentas) standards. Since 2015, the SFC adopted the International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS).
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quired or merged with other was built.
Additionally, to calculate the price of labor using personnel expenses re-
ported in the financial statements, the number of employees was taken
from the SFC. Anyhow, it should be noticed that this information had to
be complemented with data from the Central Bank and it is reported quar-
terly, so monthly time-series were built interpolating. Also, the series of
total employees resulted from adding reported employees to 80% of re-
ported sub-employees, to account for the fact that many sub-employees do
not work full-time (neither do they always work half-time).
Figure 1. Monetary Policy Rates
Note: The figure plots the policy intervention rate (TIP) and interbank overnight rate
(TIB), effective on the last day of each month.
Source: Author’s calculation using data from Colombia’s Central Bank.
Other variables were obtained from the Central Bank. These variables
include monthly and annual Inflation, measured as percentage variation of
the Consumer Price Index, CPI; the Industrial Price Index, IPI, as a proxy
for GDP (which is only available in a quarterly basis); the Intervention Rate
of the Central Bank 5, TIP; and the Interbank overnight rate 6, TIB. It should
be noted that these last two variables are reported daily, so the last obser-
vation of each month was taken as the month’s rate. The TIB is used as
5The Monetary Policy Intervention Rate is the minimum rate of expansionary auctions
of overnight loans from the Central Bank, which are awarded in Open Market Operations
(Banco de la República, 2018b).
6The Interbank Overnight Rate, TIB, is the weighted average rate of overnight inter-
bank loans that do not have collateral (Banco de la República, 2018c).
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a proxy for monetary policy because it is highly correlated with the TIP
rate (99,65%), although it shows daily variations because it also reflects
liquidity and credit risk conditions in the interbank market (see figure 1).
This rate is commonly used in the literature to proxy monetary policy (see
(Gómez-González & Grosz, 2007; Amaya, 2005; López et al., 2011; Huertas
et al., 2005)).
Variables regarding nominal or monetary amounts, such as disbursements
and all variables taken from banks’ financial statements, where deflated
using the CPI. Also, although balance-sheet data are stocks, information
from income statements is reported to the SFC as accumulated income, ex-
penses and profits. Thus, to identify monthly income statements (expenses,
income, and profit generated in each month) income, expenses and profit
accounts from the same year were differentiated and then, the values were
deflated. This transformation of the data presents some challenges, since
income statements are reported using the accrual principle, so it is possi-
ble to find decreases in accumulated income and expenses. This issue was
avoided as possible, using accumulated data when calculating ratios with
data from income statements.
Furthermore, to analyze the bank-lending channel, this study uses total
disbursements. Every bank or credit establishment is required to report to-
tal loan disbursements by type of loans and the weighted average interest
rates set on these loans 7 The definition of each loan category considered in
this study, according to the SFC, Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia
(2018), is as follows 8:
• Micro-credits: Loans of an amount not over 25 minimum monthly
legal salaries (as established by law) granted to a small business 9.
• Consumer Loans: These are loans granted to natural persons, to fi-
nance the acquisition of consumer goods or services that do not have
a commercial purpose.
7This data is available since May 2002, which constraints the time period considered
in this study.
8Current account overdrafts and credit limits authorized on credit cards are also re-
ported as disbursements by the SFC, but they are not considered in this study.
9A small business is a natural or legal person that produces some economic activity
e.g. agriculture, industry, commerce or services, that has at most 10 employees and assets
less than 501 minimum monthly legal salaries.
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• Commercial Loans: All loans different from Mortgage Loans10, Con-
sumer Loans or Micro-credits. This category includes:
– Preferential or Corporate Loans: Loans, with maturities higher
than 30 days, granted to clients that are eligible to negotiate an
interest rate.
– Treasury Loans: Loans, with maturities under 30 days, granted
to clients that are eligible to negotiate an interest rate for their
short-term liquidity needs.
– Ordinary Loans: Commercial loans that cannot be classified as
treasury loans or corporate or preferential loans.
It is worth noting that data on disbursements excludes disbursements
related to restructuring processes and only includes loans that are funded
by the bank’s own resources (not by special lines of credit (rediscount).
Also, this study focuses on analyzing the bank lending channel using data
on disbursements of Micro-credit, Consumer, and Commercial Loans. For
this, this study refers from now on to total disbursements or disbursement
of total loans, talking about the sum of disbursements on micro-credit, con-
sumer, and commercial loans. When referring to Total Loans, it is referring
to loans as the amount of assets in loans on balance-sheets.
6. Descriptive Statistics
Since 1991, Colombia’s Central Bank took on a constitutional mandate to
control inflation, also putting into consideration the maximization of pro-
duction and employment. To do this, it adopted different policies (from
controlling the exchange-rate with bands, to defining reference levels for
the monetary base). Anyway, inflation and the Interbank rate (TIB) showed
great levels of volatility, the country went through one of its worse crises
in 1999 with GDP falling 4.2%, real interest rates as high as 24% (annually)
and a credit crunch (Flórez, Posada & Escobar-R., 2004).
Then, in 2001, expansionary and contractionary auctions became the main
monetary policy of the Central Bank, and it gradually reduced the volatility
of the interbank rate (TIB) and brought inflation down to one digit levels
and to the target level (3%). As can be seen in figure 2 and figure 3, the
10Mortgage Loans are loans of any amount granted to natural persons, whose purpose
is to buy a home (under construction, new or used). They are not included in this study.
24
TIB, which follows closely the monetary policy instrument (TIP), has var-
ied according to inflation and production (approximated by the Industrial
Production Index). In periods of high inflation, the bank has implemented
contractionary policies (increasing the TIP and thus, the TIB), and when it
can implement expansionary policies to promote economic growth, with-
out losing control of inflation, it does.
Figure 2. Inflation and Interbank Rate
Note: The figure plots the interbank overnight rate, TIB, effective on the last day of each
month. Inflation is the yearly variation of the Consumer Price Index.
Source: Author’s calculation using data from Colombia’s Central Bank.
Figure 3. Production and Interbank Rate
Note: The figure plots the Industrial Production Index, adjusted to remove the time-trend
and seasonality effects. The TIB rate is the effective rate on the last day of each month.
Source: Author’s calculation using data from Colombia’s Central Bank.
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Looking at monetary policy cycles from 2002 to 2015, one can identify
four periods of contraction, accompanied by four periods of expansion.
The most pronounced cycle was around the 2008 global crisis, where yearly
inflation rose to its maximum (7.94%) in October 2010, and production was
high. Because of the crisis, inflation fell to one of its lowest points (1.84%)
and production also fell, so the central bank went into an expansionary
period, reducing the TIB to a minimum of 2.97% in December 2010, to
promote economic growth. From 2002 to 2014, Colombia went through
a period of economic expansion, except for the period of 2008 where it was
affected by the global crisis. Since the implementation of an effective infla-
tion targeting strategy for monetary policy after 2001, inflation and interest
rates were controlled and there has been an expansion of the banking sec-
tor and the loans and deposits market. Figure 4 shows total real deposits
and loans in the banking sector have experienced a positive trend, only
showing a slow in its growth rate around 2008.
Figure 4. Loans, Deposits and Production
Note: The figure plots the Industrial Production Index without any transformations, the
sum of total deposits and loans in millions COP, as reported on balance-sheets for all the
credit establish ments considered in this study.
Source: Author’s calculation.
On the other hand, in 2002 Colombia’s banking sector was also com-
ing out of a transitional period of deregulation and globalization, after the
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1991 crisis. Figure 5 shows the number of operating credit establishments
or banks registered in Colombia according to the SFC reports, showing a
process of concentration at the beginning of the century, followed by the
entrance of new establishments. At the beginning of 2002, there were 29
registered credit establishments in the SFC. From 2002 to 2004, there was
one acquisition event and two banks where dissolved. In 2005, there were
several events: one new bank was registered, 3 banks were canceled or
liquidated, and there were 5 mergers. Also, between 2006 and 2008 there
were 6 mergers/acquisitions, the license of one bank was canceled and 2
new banks began to operate. From 2009 to 2014, although there were 9
events of mergers/acquisitions, 6 new banks began operations.
Figure 5. Number of banks in Colombia
Note: The figure plots the number of registered and active credit establishments before
the financial supervisor (Superintendencia Financiera de Colombia - SFC).
Source: Author’s calculation using data from the SFC.
Table 1 shows summary statistics of data from bank’s balance sheets, for
three groups of banks depending on their asset size. Group big contains
the 11 banks with higher average assets in the sample, small includes banks
whose average assets were in the lower third, and medium includes the rest
of the banks. The average size of big banks is 16.5 billion COP, the average
size of banks in the middle group is about 1/3 of big banks’ size, 5.2 billion
COP, and small banks are 0.9 billion, about 5% of the big banks’ average
size.
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Table 1. Descriptive Statistics by Bank’s Asset Size
count mean sd min median max
Big
Total Assets 1,467 16,500,000 14,000,000 3,131,930 11,500,000 84,600,000
Total Loans 1,467 10,200,000 9,609,498 1,226,592 6,345,938 56,700,000
Securities&Money Market 1,467 3,911,542 2,722,778 541,058.9 3,213,458 14,500,000
OBS 1,466 0.245 0.127 0.034 0.223 0.870
Price of deposits 1,467 0.0033 0.00132 0.00055 0.00326 0.0113
Price of labor 1,425 4,734.4 2,172.7 686.7 4,206.3 26,341.2
Price of physical capital 1,467 0.143 0.121 0.0344 0.106 1.427
Credit Risk 1,467 0.0666 0.0485 0.00798 0.0473 0.287
Liquidity 1,467 0.331 0.115 0.137 0.310 0.611
Capitalization 1,467 0.112 0.0312 0.0251 0.109 0.233
Total Costs 1,454 298,921.7 446,031.9 21,120.16 162,827.1 10,600,000
Profit 1,467 30,770.61 38,356.6 -116,529.8 22,413.04 640,215.3
Medium
Total Assets 1,052 5,244,801 2,743,519 952,505.6 5,057,692 14,900,000
Total Loans 1,052 3,175,476 1,650,355 539,333.4 2,961,612 8,536,229
Securities&Money Market 1,052 1,391,342 1,094,369 36,351.64 1,274,953 7,615,079
OBS 1,049 0.199 0.128 0.00378 0.159 0.744
Price of deposits 1,052 0.00385 0.00133 0.00134 0.00373 0.0193
Price of labor 992 4,560.7 1,725.02 1,800.6 4,320.9 18,711.9
Price of physical capital 1,051 0.107 0.101 0.0184 0.0842 1.134
Credit Risk 1,052 0.0738 0.0762 0.00993 0.0425 0.357
Liquidity 1,052 0.302 0.104 0.0725 0.292 0.583
Capitalization 1,052 0.108 0.0329 0.0446 0.111 0.203
Total Costs 1,045 100,854.9 237,945.9 765.4 72,735.4 7,374,050
Profit 1,052 7,674.6 8,124.97 -70,301.8 6,378.8 59,484.1
Small
Total Assets 769 933,827.6 488,205.3 62,032.9 929,669.8 2,782,182
Total Loans 769 622,880.7 365,192.5 15,202.27 630,087.5 1,470,649
Securities&Money Market 769 170,849.7 168,717.5 254.7259 112,637.4 1,312,377
OBS 750 0.257 0.216 0.00279 0.191 0.874
Price of deposits 769 0.00493 0.00179 0.00064 0.00473 0.0144
Price of labor 719 6,698.7 6,086.5 917.4 4,628.325 75,362.3
Price of physical capital 768 0.220 0.233 0.0171 0.167 1.493
Credit Risk 769 0.0406 0.0331 0 0.0410 0.242
Liquidity 769 0.265 0.213 0.0165 0.191 0.897
Capitalization 769 0.181 0.107 0.0391 0.143 0.782
Total Costs 762 27,559.6 35,357.5 2,261.7 21,664.7 512,232.7
Profit 769 570.87 3,471.2 -30,286.3 979.2 13,228.7
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics for bank categories according to total assets.
The textitBig category, includes the 33% banks with the highest average total assets, the
Small category, includes the 33% banks with the lowest average total assets and the Medium
category includes the rest. All nominal amounts were deflated using the CPI. Amounts
in millions of pesos (COP).
Source: Author’s calculation.
Total loans are, on average, 10 billion COP for the bigger banks, but the
average for the lower 34% is not even 1% of this number. Thus, there is
some indication of concentration in the lending market. This relationship
also holds for average securities and assets as positions in the money mar-
ket (which includes public and private debt). Also, the Off-Balance Sheet
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variable was named as this, because it gives information on income gen-
erated by the bank by activities that are not related directly to its assets.
Then, OBS is defined as the ratio of non-interest income to total income,
where non-interest income, said roughly, gathers income from bank oper-
ations that are not related to loans, securities or money-market positions.
This ratio seems to be around 20% for all bank sizes, although it shows a
high standard deviation.
Price of deposits, which is the ratio of interest expenses on deposits to to-
tal deposits reported as liabilities, are around 0.35% (monthly) for big and
mid-size banks, but this cost is a lot higher for small banks (around 0.5%
monthly). The smaller banks also exhibit the higher price of labor, which
is the ratio of personnel and honorary expenses to total employees (includ-
ing sub-employees). Finally, the price of physical capital is calculated as
operating expenses (non-interest operating expenses minus personnel ex-
penses) over total fixed assets, is on average 14.3% for big banks, 10.7% for
mid-size banks, but again, it is a lot higher for smaller banks, 22%.
Also, there are other variables regarding the bank’s balance-sheet composi-
tion. Credit risk is the percentage of total loans that are classified (a priori)
by the bank as highly risky (of appreciable risk, significant risk or risk of
un-collectability). This variable does not vary a lot across categories and
does not seem high. Smaller banks are the ones with less credit risk, 4% on
average, while mid-size banks have the higher average credit risk, of 7.3%.
Liquidity (liquid assets over total assets) is also similar across categories,
around 30%. Smaller banks show lower levels of liquidity, although it is
possible that with regulation in Colombia following Basilea III policies in
the last year, there could be less volatility in this variable. Capitalization,
measured as total equity over total assets, is close to 11% for big and mid-
size banks. Small banks are more capitalized, 18% on average.
Finally, average costs for big banks are almost 300 thousand million COP,
while they are a bit over one-third of this number for mid-size banks. Total
costs for small banks are 27.5 thousand million COP. On the other hand,
the differences in profit are more notable for smaller banks. When looking
at the average ratio of profit over costs, only considering observations with
positive revenue, it is almost 14% and 12% for big and mid-size banks, and
a lower 10% for small banks, so intuitively, one might think bigger banks
could be more profit efficient.
Table 2 shows monthly real disbursements by banks in millions (COP),
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as reported to the SFC and following the definition presented in section
6. Total disbursements, which is a variable calculated as the sum of con-
sumer, commercial and micro-credit disbursements, is on average 1.05 bil-
lion COP. As seen in the balance-sheet data presented before, average total
disbursements for mid-size banks is about 1/3 of this number (3 hundred
thousand million COP), but for the small banks, this number falls to less
than 65 thousand million COP.
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics, Disbursements by Bank’s Asset Size
count mean sd min p50 max
Big
Total Disb. 1,427 1,049,799 1,032,202 7,186.1 762,733.6 6,795,095
Consumer&Commercial Disb. 1,427 1,045,929 1,029,328 5,100.2 762,733.6 6,774,177
Consumer Disb. 1,427 124,573.8 118,486.3 1,657.1 90,356 645,172.5
Commercial Disb. 1,427 921,355.0 973,446.3 462.5 665,581.1 6,398,547
Ordinary Disb. 1,399 285,499.1 444,601.2 38.4 76,369.45 2,936,868
Preferential Disb. 1,289 410,944.5 457,003.4 139.5 277,321.4 3,186,405
Treasury Disb. 1,347 286,305.0 330,304 7.075 174,681.3 3,012,448
Micro-credit Disb. 798 6,920.0 8,616.2 0.978 2,845.9 65,995
Medium
Total Disb. 1,016 295,236.6 282,682.4 7,760.7 205,197.9 1,755,879
Consumer&Commercial Disb. 1,016 291,053.1 283,996.7 7,180.7 195,307.8 1,755,879
Consumer Disb. 1,016 66,797.2 53,516.7 854.48 55,195.75 233,680.1
Commercial Disb. 1,016 224,256.0 267,594.1 1,400 116,506.3 1,706,716
Ordinary Disb. 953 66,173.2 100,543.2 241.95 29,997.6 692,747.4
Preferential Disb. 785 114,599.0 132,520.8 28.6 62,409.7 633,919.1
Treasury Disb. 777 96,294.5 157,807.2 26.5 38,138.2 1,224,227
Micro-credit Disb. 389 10,926.5 14,579.4 2.429 3,473.3 68,530.6
Small
Total Disb. 739 64,453.7 59,774.4 429.8 55,013 476,601.5
Consumer&Commercial Disb. 739 56,524.8 63,595 176.24 45,529.6 476,601.5
Consumer Disb. 423 18,820.2 17,147.9 0.886 13,355.03 161,643.6
Commercial Disb. 694 48,718.8 64,255.97 176.24 27,733.09 476,601.5
Ordinary Disb. 407 8,565.2 7,906 37.38 6,887.9 62,110.2
Preferential Disb. 461 242,405.7 24,191.6 87.767 18,000 139,863
Treasury Disb. 415 45,960.9 61,053.37 65.764 30,393.7 457,986.5
Micro-credit Disb. 255 22,978.5 28,346.2 6.27 2,687.03 94,039.04
Note: The table shows descriptive statistics of monthly disbursements for bank categories
according to total assets. The textitBig category, includes the 33% banks with the highest
average total assets, the Small category, includes the 33% banks with the lowest average
total assets and the Medium category includes the rest. Total disbursements is the sum of
commercial, consumer and micro-credit disbursements. All nominal amounts were de-
flated using the CPI. Amounts in millions of pesos (COP).
Source: Author’s calculation.
Furthermore, for all groups of banks by size, consumer, and commer-
cial loans represent the biggest portion of total loans, and micro-credit is
most important for small banks. Smaller banks seem to be more intensive
in consumer lending and micro-credit, considering average micro-credit
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disbursements are a much smaller fraction of total disbursements for big
and mid-size banks than for small banks. Also, average preferential loans
are proportionally higher for big and small banks than for small banks.
Figure 6. Loans and Disbursements
Note: The figure plots total disbursements (i.e. the sum of commercial, consumer
and micro-credit disbursements), consumer disbursements, commercial disbursements,
micro-credit disbursements and total loans (as reported in balance-sheet data). All the
variables are the sum of disbursements and loans from all the credit establishments con-
sidered in this study. All nominal amounts were deflated using the CPI. Amounts in
millions of pesos (COP).
To complement the data presented on table 2, figure 6 shows total dis-
bursements and loans (as assets in banks’ balance-sheet) for all credit estab-
lishments (as reported by the SFC). The dynamics of total disbursements
are driven by that of commercial loans, which represent the biggest por-
tion of total loans. Also, disbursements on commercial loans exhibit higher
volatility than commercial or micro-credit disbursements, and this last cat-
egory is extremely small, compared to the others. Considering the propor-
tion of disbursements on commercial loans to consumer or micro-credits,
intuitively one might expect that the bank-lending channel works mainly
through this line of credit, although credit demand might be equally af-
fected for commercial and consumer loans.
Also, it is clear that there is a structural change in disbursements from De-
cember 2010 to January 2011. Total disbursements fell 72%, driven by a fall
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in commercial loans of 74.4%, and keeping a lower level from that moment
on. This decrease in disbursements of commercial loans was driven by a
73.3% fall in ordinary loans, a 74.3% decrease of disbursements of preferen-
tial loans and 76.4% fall in disbursements of treasury loans. This variation
was due to a demand shock (not a supply shock) because of a regulatory
change.
Before January 2011 and the implementation of a tax reform (Ley 1430 de
2010, (Congreso, 2010)), the tax to financial transactions (GMF), which is a
tax proportional to the amount of any financial transaction, was not appli-
cable to disbursements to third parties and disbursements that were settled
on the same day. This regulatory reform included as part of the taxable
basis, disbursements to third parties unless they were mortgage loans or
destined to buy cars or fixed assets 11. Thus, disbursements or payments
to third parties for different concepts such as the payment of payrolls, ser-
vices, vendors, or of any liability, became taxable (Congreso, 2010). Then,
the use of disbursements as a mechanism to make payments avoiding the
GMF, that would be applicable to payments via current accounts, for ex-
ample, b ecame unattractive when costs were driven up by the tax. This
explains why disbursements showed a peak right before the application of
this law and a high and sustained drop afterward, but the growth rate of
total loans in the banking industry was not significantly altered.
On the other hand, previous data gives a hint of market concentration in
Colombia’s banking sector. To analyze this, a concentration index for the
industry, the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index12 was calculated, particularly
for the loans market. Figure 7 shows the evolution of the HHI calculated
with banks’ participation in two different variables: total disbursements
in the industry and total loans. The HHI for total disbursements is much
more volatile than the HHI for total loans.
Figure 7 clearly indicates that market concentration increased from 2005 to
2008 (going from 0.06 to 0.11) after several merger events, but it stayed rel-
atively stable afterward, a bit under 0.12. Also, figure 8 shows how market
share of the 6 biggest banks (by average asset size in the sample) evolved
over time. These banks went through processes of mergers or acquisitions
where their market share shows sudden rises. Market participation stays
11Article 6, Law 1430 of 2010
12The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is a measure of market concentration that is
calculated as the sum of the squares of the participation of each individual in the industry
(Ortiz, Zuleta, Misas, Jaramillo & others, 2016).
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high after these peaks, which drives up market concentration and probably
increases the market power of these banks.
Figure 7. Herfindahl-Hirschman Index for Loans
Note: The figure plots the calculated HHI for the loans market. HHI of Total Disburse-
ments is calculated using participation with data on total disbursements (i.e. commercial,
consumer, and micro-credit), and the HHI for Total Loans, using participation with data
from bank’s balance-sheets, for the banks considered in this study.
Source: Author’s calculation using data from the SFC.
Figure 8. Market Share, Loans Market
Note: The figure plots the participation or market share of the 6 biggest banks in the loans
market, considering total loans reported on balance-sheets.




Consider banks as rational agents that take maximizing decisions in an en-
vironment of imperfect competition (Baglioni, 2007). To understand the
dynamics of the banking industry and the mechanisms that determine in-
terest rates and loan supply, a simple and motivating oligopoly model, the
Klein-Monti model, is presented following Freixas & Rochet (2008) and
Jonas & King (2008). In a simplifying manner, banks are considered fi-
nancial intermediaries that buy loans and sell deposits with a given tech-
nology, thus incurring in costs. Also, banks are supposed to be of equal
size and market power, but their cost structures may differ. This motivat-
ing model assumes a Cournot oligopoly, where banks’ competition is on
quantities, as opposed to a Bertrand oligopoly, where competition is on
prices13.
Suppose there are i=1,2,. . .N banks, and they are all supposed to have only
two assets, one liability, and for simplicity, assume that they have not re-
ceived money from investors, meaning equity equals zero. These banks
get liquidity from their clients in the form of deposits D, they settle loans
L and must keep liquid reserves R. They do not hold capital or fixed as-
sets, so there is no investment and the risk-taking behavior of banks (and
the cost of capital that these risks entail) are not included or modeled, as a
simplifying assumption. Thus, because of the balance-sheet constraint, it
must be that assets equal the bank’s liabilities.
Di = Ri + Li (1)
Furthermore, these banks may choose to leave banking reserves in cash
C, or take a (net) position in the interbank market (better known as the
money market) M. To simplify, it is fine to assume that operations in this
market are short-term settlements and entail minimum risk, so that the
price of the market, the interest rate, is exogenous and equals the monetary
policy rate, r.
Ri = Ci +Mi (2)
13This model could be extended to consider other market structures, such as Perfect
Competition, Monopolistic Competition or a Bertrand oligopoly. Considering the scope
of this study, only the Cournot oligopoly case is presented, as a motivation to consider het-
erogeneous characteristics of banks as determinants of a differentiated reaction to mone-
tary policy shocks.
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On the other hand, cash does not yield any interest rate. Then, it is
reasonable to assume that banks would only want to leave reserves in cash
to the minimum amount required by the regulator. Thus, consider α as
the percentage of deposits from clients that the bank must leave as cash
reserves according to the central bank.
Ci = αDi (3)
Furthermore, this model entails a simplistic assumption that there are
three agents in the real sector, the government, firms, and households.
Households have savings and banks are intermediaries for firms to access
these resources, so they can finance investment. The government deficit
is financed issuing securities (∆B) and changing the monetary base, that
consists of all cash reserves held by banks (C). Therefore, households are
assumed to have zero cash holdings, the monetary base equals total cash
reserves in the bank system and households’ money equals total deposits
in the economy.
Continuing with the analysis of the banking sector, from equation (3), we
could describe the position of each bank in the money market asMi > 0, if
the bank has enough reserves (surpassing the cash requirements from the
central bank). Intuitively, the bank only takes to the money market those
resources that it does not have to leave as cash reserves and that it does not
use as funding to lend in the credit market.
Ri = αDi +Mi
Di − Li = αDi +Mi
Mi = (1− α)Di − Li
(4)
Notice that banks face a demand for loans, whose inverse function is
rL(L), whereL = L1+· · ·+Ln; Li = L/n and δrL(L)/δL < 0, δ2rL(L)/δL2 <
0 (assuming convexity and a continuously differentiable function). More-
over, they face a supply of deposits, whose inverse function is assumed to
be rD(D), where D = D1 + · · · + Dn; Di = D/n and δrD(D)/δD > 0. Also,
consider that to be able to lend and receive deposits, banks must spend
physical and human capital that must be compensated, so there are costs
involved in the production of the bank’s outputs. Consider these admin-
istrative costs as given by TCi = f(Di, Li), such that δTCi(Di, Li)/δLi > 0;
δTCi(Di, Li)/δDi > 0 and δ2TCi(Di, Li)/δL2i = γi > 0.
Then, without loss of generality, it is possible to assume that each bank
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acts as a rational agent that must choose the level ofDi and Li, maximizing
their profit or utility function, considering strategically what would be the
decision of other participating agents. Then, the following profit function
is proposed.
πi(Li, Di) = rL(L)Li + rMi − rD(D)Di − TCi(Li, Di)
= rL(L)Li + r[(1− α)Di − Li]− rD(D)Di − TCi(Li, Di)
= [rL(L)− r]Li + [r(1− α)− rD(D)]Di − TCi(Li, Di)
(5)
Thus, the bank’s maximizer behavior follows the first order conditions





































Applying the Implicit Function Theorem to equation (6), the reaction












































However, consider the Cournot oligopoly case with just two banks, and
define L∗ as the equilibrium level of the loans market. Then, one could
solve equation (8) for each bank and find the following reaction function



















































As follows from equation (9), the denominator is positive and the nomi-
nator is negative, so the reaction of loan supply from each bank to a contrac-
tionary monetary policy is negative, meaning that loan supply should fall
when the policy rate rises. Also, equation (10) is positive (both the denom-
inator and the nominator are positive) meaning that a bank’s reaction to an
increase in the monetary policy interest rate (which is negative) becomes
less negative as γi increases. Because γi is the slope of the marginal cost
function of bank i to produce loans, an increase in this parameter means
that the bank becomes less efficient. Then, if defining a parameter for cost
efficiency ρ = 1/γ, where an increase in ρmeans a bank becomes more cost
efficient, it is possible to say that the more efficient a bank is, the negative
reaction of loans to an increase in the monetary policy rate will be greater
(more negative) or faster.
7.2. Heterogeneity and Bank Efficiency
As it was shown in section 4.2 and proposed in section 7.1 using a theoret-
ical model, the transmission of monetary policy through the bank-lending
channel seems to be dependable on specific characteristics of banks. This
study considers different sources of heterogeneity according to what has
been done previously in the literature, and it extends the work of Jonas &
King (2008) to the Colombian banking industry.
The basic sources of heterogeneity in the banking sector can be obtained
from relationships of variables from bank’s balance-sheet data. These vari-
ables are capitalization, liquidity, and operational and financial efficiency.
Capitalization is measured as the ratio of equity over total assets. Liquidity
is measured as liquid assets over total assets, where liquid assets include
cash holdings, negotiable and available to sell public and private debt, and
active positions in the money market (including posted collateral). Oper-
ational and financial efficiency are measured as the commonly used ratios
of total operating expenses over total assets and total operating expenses
net of interests over total income, accordingly.
Anyhow, financial and operational efficiency are balance-sheet ratios that
do not show the complete picture of the cost structure of each bank, so it
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may not represent well the cost function of each bank. To achieve a better
measure of efficiency, this study estimates the optimal cost function and
cost efficiency of each bank, according to the theory of firm efficiency.
To begin, consider there are two different types of efficiency of any pro-
duction firm: technical efficiency and allocative efficiency. Technical effi-
ciency is related to the ability to produce at the optimal level or achieve the
maximum level of production possible given the level of inputs (output-
oriented efficiency), or, the ability to use the minimum level of inputs to
produce a certain level of production (input-oriented efficiency) (Kumb-
hakar & Lovell, 2003). Allocative efficiency consists of choosing the best
combination of inputs, given a certain level of output and input prices, or
choosing the best combination of outputs, given a combination of inputs
and their prices (Kumbhakar, Wang & Horncastle, 2015).
Technical efficiency and allocative efficiency form together the concept of
economic efficiency, a concept that is related to the economic behavior of
the decision-making agent. Considering a cost maximizing agent, eco-
nomic efficiency is studied in the form of cost efficiency (choosing the op-
timal input quantities given input prices and output quantities). Consid-
ering a profit-maximizing agent, economic efficiency is approached in the
way of profit efficiency (choosing the optimal output quantities - or prices
- given output prices - or quantities - and input prices) 14 (Kumbhakar &
Lovell, 2003). As Estrada (2004) explains, in the presence of perfect com-
petition, cost and profit efficiency should be identical with a fixed level of
output, but if there is market power involved, a firm may be profit efficient
but cost inefficient or vice-versa.
Also, some studies relate efficiency to scale and scope economies. An in-
dustry shows scale economies when it has a production function such that
when inputs are increased by a proportion λ, then outputs increase by a
proportion equal to or greater thanλ (Kumbhakar et al., 2015). On the other
hand, scope economies exist among outputs when the production func-
tions of two different outputs, are such that the cost of producing them sep-
arately is greater than it would be if they were produced together (Mester,
1996).
14The product of technical efficiency and allocative efficiency is sometimes referred to
in the literature as X-efficiency.
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This study estimates cost efficiency 15 of the banking sector in Colombia fol-
lowing the previous work of Estrada (2004) and Sarmiento & Galán (2017),
and the theoretical development of Kumbhakar et al. (2015) for the Stochas-
tic Frontier approach (SFA).
Suppose banks are technically inefficient firms, whose objective is to de-
fine a level of output y that minimizes costs. If e−η ≤ 1 is the technical
inefficiency factor, the minimum cost function of each bank, with j inputs
and input prices w, can be written as in equation (11). The actual costs








wjxj = C∗ exp(η)
→ lnCa = lnC∗(w,y) + η
(12)
To estimate equation (12), suppose a trans-log specification for lnC∗
with 3 inputs and 3 outputs and add a noise term to make the function
stochastic. The outputs are total loans y1, securities y2 (which includes to-
tal investments and active positions in the money market), and off-balance
sheet activities y3, which is defined as the ratio of non-interest income (in-
come that is not related to loans or securities) to total income. The input
prices are the price of deposits w1, the price of labor w2 and the price of
physical capital w3. Then, for bank i, at time t, the equation to be estimated
is as follows.
lnCait = lnC



























βjk lnwj,it ln yk,it + vit + ηit
(13)
15For further studies, considering the banking sector in Colombia exhibits a certain level
of market concentration and market power (it is not perfectly competitive as shown in sec-
tion 6), profit efficiency should also be estimated, since a cost-efficient bank is not neces-
sarily profit-efficient and vice-versa.
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Furthermore, the following restrictions must be imposed to ensure lin-

















These restrictions are included in the estimation of equation (13), by
normalizing total costs and input prices with one of the other input prices,
w3, so the new equation to be estimated is as in (15). Also, a time trend
is included in the estimated equation to allow for technological progress





















































t+ vit + ηit
(15)
This equation is estimated by Maximum Likelihood estimation, impos-
ing distributional assumptions on η and v. The assumption on the error
term is v iid∼ N(0, σ2v). Also, heteroscedasticity is assumed because the inef-
ficiency term may depend on bank-specific characteristics, so the assump-
tion on η is that it follows a half-normal distribution η ∼ N+(0, σ2η,i), and
the variance of η is modeled. The variance of technical inefficiency is mod-
eled as in equation (16).
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σ2η,i = exp(zitδ) (16)
The bank-specific characteristics used to model the inefficiency term are
the natural logarithm of size or total assets (z1 ) ; credit risk (z2), measured
as the percentage of risky loans16 to total loans; liquidity (z3) and capital-
ization (z4), as defined previously; and a time trend to allow time effects on
the efficiency estimates.17
The estimated measure of inefficiency for each bank in each time period
is given by equation (17). Then, this measure of inefficiency can only take
positive values equal to or higher than one, so that when Eit = 1 all devi-
ations from the optimal cost functions are due to random error, and when
Eit > 1, deviations are due in part to random errors but also to ineffi-
ciency of the bank, conditional on outputs and inputs prices. The measure
TEit = 1/Eit is bounded between 0 and 1 and can be interpreted as the
percentage of actual costs that equal optimal costs, so the higher TE, the
more cost efficient is the bank.
Eit = E[exp(vit)|vit + ηit] (17)
Finally, the estimation of equation (15) is used to calculate returns to
scale (RTS) for each bank at each point in time and a Lerner Index to proxy
market power. The measure of RTS is the reciprocal of cost elasticity with
respect to output, which is, in turn, the derivative of equation (15) with
respect to y (Kumbhakar et al., 2015). On the other hand, the Lerner Index
is measured as in equation 18, where the price of loansP loans is measured as
interest income from loans over total loans, and the marginal cost of loans
MC loans is measured as in equation (19), where ECyit is total cost elasticity
for loans (from the stochastic frontier estimation).
Lloansit =







16Risky loans are those reported to the SFC classified as loans with appreciable risk,
significant risk, and risk of un-collectibility .
17It is worth noting that market risk exposure (the ratio of securities to total assets) is
not included because it is highly correlated with credit risk, and the importance of foreign
ownership to model bank efficiency was tested, but this variable was not significant.
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7.3. Monetary Policy Transmission
The empirical approach to analyzing if bank-specific characteristics affect
the way monetary policy is transmitted through the allocation of loans is
a dynamic panel model. This methodology considers the seminal work of
Kashyap & Stein (1995) and the work of Jonas & King (2008), which use
time series analysis. Furthermore, given that the data used for Colombia
has a small number of individuals but considerably long time-series, the
approach is a long panel data, like Gómez-González & Grosz (2007) does.
Therefore, this study models the growth-rate of loans disbursements, yit
(specifically disbursements of consumer loans, commercial loans and micro-
credits), with changes in the TIB rate, ∆rt, and the interaction of bank spe-
cific characteristics lagged one period (Bit−1) with changes in the TIB rate,
to evaluate if the transmission mechanism of the shock is not direct but
may be heterogeneously transmitted because of these characteristics. Also,
the model includes dummies for each quarter to control for seasonality Qj
(omitting the dummy for the first quarter), a lagged dummy to control for
mergers and acquisitions,MA, that takes the value of 1 if the bank merged
or acquired another bank, and a dummy that takes the value of 1 on Jan-
uary 2011, Tax, to account for the Tax Reform that was implemented on
this date. As macroeconomic variables to control for demand effects, infla-
tion, π is included and the growth of the Industrial Production Index, IPI ,
to proxy GDP growth (which is only available in quarterly data).
All non-stationary variables are included in differences and the natural
logarithm of disbursements is used to smooth variance. Also, 5 lags of
the endogenous variable were included after analyzing the autocorrela-
tion behavior of the variable, and 6 lags of ∆rt and the IPI growth were
also included, considering this is a good time-frame to account for lags in
the decision making process of banks, avoiding over-identification of the
model and considering the transmission of monetary policy, that at least
through the interest rate channel, may take up to 8 months (Gómez et al.,
2016).
As bank-specific characteristics, 7 different measures are considered. These
variables are technical efficiency, measured by the SFA approach presented
in section 7.2), two balance-sheet indicators of efficiency (financial efficiency
and operational efficiency), liquidity, capitalization, returns to scale, and
the Lerner Index for the loans market, to account for market power.
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Therefore, the proposed model is estimated as in equation 20 with a robust
fixed effects estimation. Given that the estimated panel is a long panel, the
Nickel Bias that is generated by the presence of the endogenous variables
is reduced and the fixed effects estimation is consistent (Nickell, 1981). 18
∆ ln yi,t = β0 +
5∑
j=1


















Finally, it is worth explaining two differences between my methodolog-
ical approach and previous literature.
First, although studies such as Gómez-González & Grosz (2007), Kashyap
& Stein (1995), Kashyap & Stein (2000) and Jonas & King (2008) take the
growth rate of loans in the bank’s balance sheet as the dependent variable,
this study is focused on disbursements, because growth rate of loans is
not only affected by supply and demand for loans at certain moments in
time, but it may also be affected by different events, such as payments of
previously issued loans and portfolio purchases. Since the bank-lending
channel is defined as a change in loans supply, disbursements could ap-
proximate better the equilibrium quantity of the loans market. Addition-
ally, as a robustness test, the proposed methodology (with both a dynamic
and non-dynamic approach) was also implemented for data on the growth
rate of total loans, commercial loans, consumer loans and micro-credits (to-
tal, net of provisions and ordinary, which are strictly funded with bank’s
resources), in the same time-frame. There was not a statistically significant
relationship between the growth rate of loans in the bank’s balance-sheet
and movements in the Interbank rate. These results are available upon re-
quest.
Second, the literature has studied the bank lending channel modeling the
18As a robustness test, the dynamic model was also estimated using the Arellano-Bond
model for dynamic panels, although it is not recommended for long panels (Lillo & Tor-
recillas, 2018).
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growth rate of loans through both dynamic models (i.g. (Kashyap & Stein,
2000)) and models without dynamic components of the endogenous vari-
able. Gómez-González & Grosz (2007) argue that there is not a clear rea-
son to believe the growth rate of loans may depend on previous values of
this variable, unless it does because of demand dynamics, but they argue
that these dynamics should be captured by macroeconomic controls and its
lags. This study models disbursements using a dynamic panel, after test-
ing if the endogenous variable presents an autocorrelation behavior, and
because it is possible that there is some inertia in the loans market. There
is evidence that the lags of the endogenous variable are statistically signif-
icant up to the fifth lag and the fit of the model is substantially better than
estimating it without including dynamics of the endogenous model.
8. Results
8.1. Bank Heterogeneity and Efficiency
This study estimates a stochastic frontier for bank’s total costs in Colombia,
from 2002 to 2014, following the estimation methodology explained in sec-
tion 7.2, and using Stata’s Frontier command (Stata, 2013). The results of
this estimation are presented in table 3. This study finds statistically signif-
icant evidence of technical inefficiency in Colombia’s banking sector, and
furthermore, this inefficiency is dependable on bank-specific characteris-
tics.
To analyze the results presented in table 3, consider that the elasticity of to-
tal costs to output cannot be analyzed by looking directly at the estimated
coefficients of the frontier regression. Because there are interaction terms,
these elasticities will be dependable on other variables, so they will depend
on bank and time specific data. On the other hand, it is possible to conclude
from the estimation results that the cost frontier exhibits a time trend. The
coefficient of t is negative, so there is evidence of a reduction of costs over
time, but the positive coefficient on the quadratic term of the time trend
indicates that this reduction is not linear and may be lower through time
(although interactions of t with ot her variables should be analyzed more
closely for a definite interpretation too).
Furthermore, the bank-specific characteristics used to model the heteroscedas-
tic variance of the inefficiency term, are all statistically significant. Thus,
size, liquidity levels, capitalization and credit risk are important determi-
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nants of bank’s cost efficiency, and failing to account for this heterogeneity
could result in biased estimators of technical efficiency. The sign of these
variables and the time trend that was included can be interpreted directly.
Size, liquidity, and capitalization are related to higher technical efficiency,
whereas higher credit risk (having higher proportions of risky loans) is re-
lated to lower cost efficiency.
Table 3. Stochastic Frontier Estimation
ln(Ca/w3) Coeff. z σ Coeff. z
ln y1 1.478∗∗ (2.29) lnσ2v -2.478∗∗∗ (-41.97)
ln y2 -0.830∗ (-1.79) lnσ2u
ln y3 1.677∗∗∗ (3.14) z1 size 1.90e-11∗∗∗ (4.88)
(ln y1)2 0.0249 (0.85) z2 credit risk -5.131∗∗∗ (-5.19)
(ln y2)2 0.0547∗∗∗ (3.57) z3 liquidity 1.943∗∗∗ (5.49)
(ln y3)2 0.126∗∗∗ (5.61) z4 capitalization 5.649∗∗∗ (7.40)
lnw1/w3 -0.245 (-0.29) t -0.132∗∗∗ (-7.87)
lnw2/w3 2.641∗∗∗ (3.36) Constant -1.876∗∗∗ (-8.23)
(lnw1/w3)2 -0.124∗∗ (-2.02)
(lnw2/w3)2 -0.0872∗ (-1.86)
ln y1 ln y2 -0.0204 (-0.92)
ln y1 ln y3 -0.103∗∗∗ (-4.14)
ln y2 ln y3 0.0529∗∗∗ (2.58)
ln(w1/w3) ln(w2/w3) 0.117∗∗ (2.46)
ln y1 ln(w1/w3) 0.142∗∗∗ (3.70)
ln y1 ln(w2/w3) -0.0711∗∗ (-2.23)
ln y2 ln(w1/w3) -0.169∗∗∗ (-6.31)
ln y2 ln(w2/w3) 0.0154 (0.62)
ln y3 ln(w1/w3) 0.166∗∗∗ (4.78)
ln y3 ln(w2/w3) 0.0207 (0.63)
t -0.475∗∗∗ (-4.21)
t2 0.0102∗∗∗ (5.77)
ln y1t 0.0411∗∗∗ (7.69)
ln y2t -0.0503∗∗∗ (-14.23)




N = 3,085 Log likelihood = -1,541.4167
Note: z statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The table presents
the estimated coefficients (and the z statistics, of the (costs) Stochastic Frontier estimation,
as proposed in equation 15. It also shows the results of the estimation of the technical
inefficiency variance (which is assumed to be heteroscedastic, with the variance function
depending on a linear combination of bank-specific characteristics), using the FRONTIER
command in Stata (Stata, 2013).
Also, as explained in section 7.2, this study estimates technical (cost)
efficiency after estimating the stochastic cost frontier for banks, and with
the coefficients of the cost function, returns to scale (RTS) were also esti-
mated. Figure 9 presents the empirical distribution of all estimated values
of technical efficiency and RTS (for each bank in each period of time), using
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a histogram and a Kernel density plot. First, technical efficiency is skewed
to the right, and RTS are skewed to the left, although the first presents
higher heterogeneity. The mean technical efficiency estimation is 70.13%
and 50% of the observations fall between 64.9% and 79.9%. This result is
aligned with previous findings in the literature (Almanza-Ramı́rez, 2012;
Fernández & Estrada, 2013; Sarmiento et al., 2014), and can be intuitively
interpreted, as if the average bank could have produced the same output,
using 70.1% of its costs, if it had no inefficiencies. Additionally, average RTS
is 0.89 and half of the observations fall between 0.84 and 0.93, indicating
that there are few banks that show increasing returns to scale. In general,
Colombia’s bank cost structure shows evidence of decreasing returns to
scale.
Figure 9. Distribution of Technical Efficiency and Returns to Scale
Note: This graph plots the histogram (grey) and Kernel distribution (red) of the estimated
Technical Efficiency and the Returns to Scale values for all banks in the sample.
Source: Author’s calculation.
Looking at the evolution of the estimated technical efficiency over time,
figure 10 shows a slightly increasing trend of technical efficiency, although
it also evidences high heterogeneity among banks. This graph suggests
that the period from 2005 to 2007, which was characterized by several events
of mergers and acquisitions in the industry, was a generally positive one for
banks, regarding cost efficiency. Also, in 2008 and 2009 there was a fall in
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cost efficiency and increased heterogeneity, that could be linked to the spill-
over effects of the world crisis in Colombia’s banking sector. From 2010 to
2014, technical efficiency slightly increased and showed a small positive
trend.
Figure 10. Evolution of Technical Efficiency
Note: This figure shows the evolution of technical efficiency over time. The figure plots
the estimated values of technical efficiency for each December, from 2002 to 2014. The
dots in the graph represent outliers, the limits of the boxes represent the upper and lower
quartile values (excluding outliers), and the line across the box is the median. The limits
of the whiskers are the maximum and minimum values, excluding outliers.
Source: Author’s calculation.
Furthermore, this study estimates other sources of bank heterogeneity,
besides technical efficiency and RTS. I also estimate a Lerner Index to ap-
proximate market power of banks in the loans market, using the estimation
of the cost function to calculate marginal costs of loans. Also, balance-sheet
data was used to calculate capitalization, liquidity, operational efficiency
and financial efficiency ratios, which are some of the variables usually con-
sidered by analysts to evaluate the performance of the banking sector. All
of these variables are time and bank-specific, so the mean value of each
variable is presented, for each bank in the sample, in table 4.
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Table 4. Bank Heterogeneity
Technical Returns to Lerner Capitalization Liquidity Financial Operational
Efficiency Scale Index Efficiency Efficiency
Big
Bancolombia 0.66 0.886 0.8 0.145 0.284 0.727 0.0192
Banco de Bogotá 0.591 0.866 0.75 0.147 0.34 0.486 0.0158
Davivienda 0.699 0.886 0.833 0.119 0.272 0.723 0.0171
BBVA Colombia 0.757 0.847 0.839 0.093 0.297 0.724 0.016
Banco de Occidente 0.72 0.856 0.816 0.129 0.338 0.568 0.0119
Banagrario 0.714 0.99 0.875 0.077 0.54 0.507 0.008 (-)
Banco Popular 0.72 0.929 0.853 0.113 0.315 0.389 (-) 0.0103
Granbanco S.A. 0.67 0.87 0.831 0.117 0.468 0.554 0.0108
Banco Cafetero 0.775 0.865 0.814 0.038(-) 0.547 0.719 0.0139
Colpatria Red Multibanca 0.781 0.903 0.871 0.094 0.2 0.66 0.0152
Banco Corpbanca 0.747 0.851 0.762 0.11 0.322 0.808 0.0233
Medium
Citibank 0.602 0.849 0.74 0.159 0.323 0.776 0.033
Helm Bank 0.71 0.846 0.738 0.124 0.247 0.507 0.0167
Banco Caja Social S.A. 0.658 0.891 0.896 0.106 0.255 0.722 0.015
Sudameris Colombia 0.775 0.817 0.841 0.077 0.447 0.501 0.0114
AV Villas 0.715 0.828 0.86 0.112 0.313 0.637 0.0122
Conavi Banco Comercial S.A. 0.722 0.91 0.85 0.09 0.33 0.665 0.016
Banco Granahorrar S.A. 0.722 0.883 0.83 0.106 0.337 0.583 0.0133
Banco Colmena S.A 0.75 0.924 0.838 0.066 0.372 0.713 0.0152
Megabanco S.A. 0.471 (-) 0.907 0.83 0.058 0.253 0.402 0.0134
Bancoomeva 0.825 1.068 0.883 0.082 0.111 0.781 0.0156
Banco Pichincha S.A. 0.811 0.932 0.85 0.133 0.154 0.643 0.0142
Small
Anglo Colombiano 0.779 0.906 0.839 0.099 0.268 0.844 0.0202
Bansuperior 0.676 0.871 0.9 (+) 0.143 0.189 0.653 0.0243
Tequendama S.A. 0.735 1.012 0.778 0.106 0.165 0.752 0.0456
Finandina 0.841 (+) 1.279 (+) 0.818 0.144 0.106 0.725 0.0155
Banco Falabella S.A. 0.787 0.922 0.875 0.198 0.074 0.734 0.0226
Bancamı́a 0.67 1.041 0.895 0.26 0.088 0.705 0.0232
Unión Colombiano 0.667 0.813 0.791 0.114 0.233 0.486 0.0182
Banco W S.A. 0.735 0.962 0.888 0.48 (+) 0.049 (-) 0.726 0.0206
Banco Aliadas S.A. 0.684 0.978 0.858 0.121 0.143 0.664 0.0274
Scotiabank 0.494 0.741 (-) -0.814 (-) 0.194 0.668 (+) 0.921 0.0606 (+)
Bankboston S.A. 0.735 0.914 0.787 0.217 0.254 0.894 0.0488
Procredit Colombia 0.686 1.1 0.855 0.243 0.18 1.027 (+) 0.0209
Total 0.701 0.894 0.769 0.127 0.307 0.664 0.0193
Note: The symbols (-) and (+) denote the minimum and maximum value of each column.
This table shows the average value of each variable for each bank in the sample, and banks
are divided into groups according to their average asset size. Technical Efficiency, Returns
to Scale and the Lerner Index, were estimated using the results of the Stochastic Frontier
Analysis, while Capitalization, Liquidity, Financial Efficiency and Operational Efficiency
are balance-sheet ratios. Also, while higher values of Technical Efficiency indicate more
efficiency, higher values of Financial Efficiency and Operational Efficiency are indicators
of higher inefficiency, but they are defined as such because they are commonly used ratios.
From table 4, Finandina, a small bank (in the lowest quartile of asset
size), shows the highest average technical efficiency, and it is not only one of
the few banks in the sample that exhibit increasing returns to scale (1.279),
but the one with the highest value estimated. On the other hand, a mid-
size bank, Megabanco, is the bank with the lower mean technical efficiency
and it does not exhibit increasing returns to scale. The bank with the most
decreasing returns to scale is Scotiabank. Additionally, the average Lerner
Index was 0.769, which shows evidence of high market power of banks in
the loans market. The biggest banks show average values of the Lerner In-
dex close to or higher than the average value of the whole sample, but small
banks show the highest values, probably because many of them are con-
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centrated in the consumer segment, where clients have less market power.
Regarding the balance-sheet ratios, capitalization is on average 12.7% and
liquidity is 30.7%, but there is great heterogeneity among banks. The less
capitalized bank was Banco Cafetero, a public bank, while the most capital-
ized bank is Procredit Colombia, a foreign entity. Regarding liquidity, Sco-
tiabank was the most liquid bank (67% of their assets where liquid assets),
and the less liquid is Banco W S.A., a local establishment that began oper-
ations in 2011. Big banks show higher mean values of liquidity compared
to the others, but small banks are the most capitalized, in general.
Also, financial efficiency is a commonly analyzed balance-sheet ratio that is
used to assess the efficient use of resources, because it shows the relation-
ship of operating expenses (net of interests) to total income. The average
financial efficiency ratio is 66%, the minimum is that of Banco Popular (39%).
Also, the operational efficiency ratio shows the ratio of operating expenses
to total assets, so it should also be understood that a higher ratio shows
evidence of inefficiency in the use of resources19. Because operational ex-
penses are monthly, and assets are a stock, this ratio seems small. Anyway,
the average operational efficiency ratio is 1.93%. Also, although the tech-
nical, operational and financial efficiency measures give information on
banks’ inefficiency, technical efficiency considers the whole cost structure
of the company, whereas balance-sheet ratios may miss relevant informa-
tion.
Finally, figure 11 shows the average heterogeneity measures for the com-
plete sample (average) and the five biggest banks, (normalized so that they
could be compared in the same graph). Regarding technical efficiency, only
2 banks are above the average and all of them are below the average in RTS
(they all show decreasing returns to scale). Also, the two biggest banks are
more capitalized than the average, and there is less heterogeneity consider-
ing liquidity (all of them are close to the average). Regarding the balance-
sheet measures of efficiency, all the five biggest banks show operational ef-
ficiency measures below the average, showing a smaller ratio of expenses
to assets, although three banks are above the average financial efficiency
ratio (are less efficient). Last, four banks show an average Lerner index in
the loans market greater than the average, and the other one, Banco de Bo-
19It should be clear that a bank is more efficient, showing a better relationship of costs
to income and costs to assets, when the financial efficiency ratio and the operational ef-
ficiency ratio are lower. In contrast, the technical efficiency measure says a bank is more
efficient when the measure is higher.
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gotá, is close to the average. This evidence suggests market power is greater
for the biggest banks.
Figure 11. Comparison of heterogeneity measures
Note: The values of the heterogeneity variables presented in this graph were standardized
using the maximum value of each, to make comparison easier. Higher values of technical
efficiency indicate a bank is more efficient, meanwhile higher values of the ratios known
as operational and financial efficiency, indicate a bank is more inefficient. Higher values
of the Lerner index indicate higher market power, and RTS, capitalization and liquidity
are interpreted directly.
Source: Author’s calculation.
8.2. Monetary Policy Transmission
The main objective of this study is to assess if there is evidence of a bank-
lending channel, where a monetary policy shock impacts loan supply, and
to evaluate if this mechanism is not direct and homogeneous for banks,
but heterogeneously determined on bank-specific characteristics. In or-
der to do this, equation 20 was estimated using a robust fixed effects esti-
mation20, and independent estimations were done for total disbursements
20Considering there could be questions regarding the significance of a Nickel Bias in
the estimation because of the presence of endogenous variables, the model was also es-
timated using the Arellano-Bond method. Over-identification and autocorrelation in the
error term were tested using the Sargent and Arellano-Bond tests, accordingly. Results
are consistent between the two approaches so the fixed effects results are presented, con-
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(the sum of commercial, consumer, and micro-credits), Commercial and
Consumer disbursements, Commercial disbursements and Consumer dis-
bursements. First, the model was estimated without heterogeneous effects
to test if there was evidence of a (direct) bank-lending channel. Then, inter-
action terms were added with each heterogeneity variable independently,
to see if the transmission mechanism was indirectly determined by these
characteristics.
The methodology followed in this study has an identification issue that
should be addressed better in further studies. Loans disbursements may
be considered an approximation of the equilibrium quantity of loans de-
mand and supply, but it is not possible to observe supply of loans directly.
Macroeconomic controls are added to control for demand shocks in the
loans market, so this study considers these results as suggesting supply
movements.
Table 5 shows the estimation results for the growth rate of total, consumer
and commercial disbursements (together and individually), considering
the lag of the estimated technical efficiency measure as the heterogene-
ity variable in the interaction term. The estimation results of the model
estimated without heterogeneity and considering RTS, the Lerner Index,
capitalization, liquidity, operational efficiency and financial efficiency as
heterogeneity variables in the interaction term, can be found in Annex B.
Also, table 6 shows the total effect of a change in the TIB rate, and the coef-
ficient preceding the heterogeneity variable. These effects are the sum of
the coefficients of the change in the TIB rate and the sum of the coefficients
of the interaction term, considering only the ones that are statistically sig-
nificant at levels of at least 1%, 5%, and 10%. Additionally, table 7 shows
the estimated total effect, at a 10% level of confidence, of a shock to the TIB
rate on the growth rate of loans for the average bank (considering the aver-
age value of the heterogeneity variable).
The estimations without heterogeneity show evidences of the existence
of a bank-lending channel in Colombia, particularly through Commercial
loans. The estimated total effect of a shock in the TIB rate is negative (at
a 10% level) when there is no heterogeneity included (see tables 6 and 7).
The results indicate the growth rate of total disbursement would fall 3.26
percentage points after a 1 percentage point increase in the TIB rate (after
sidering this is a long panel (Lillo & Torrecillas, 2018).
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controlling for macroeconomic effects). Lags of changes in the TIB rate are
statistically significant to explain the growth rate of disbursements in sub-
sequent periods, with closer lags having less explanatory power (see table
9 in Annex B). This shows that a shock in the TIB rate generated by a mon-
etary policy shock, will affect disbursements in subsequent periods (after
2 or 3 months).
Table 5. Technical Efficiency
Independent Dependent variable ∆ ln yt (disbursements)
variables (1) Total (2) Consumer&Commercial (3) Commercial (4) Consumer
∆ ln yt−1 -0.566∗∗∗ (-14.97) -0.564∗∗∗ (-15.78) -0.568∗∗∗ (-16.79) -0.402∗∗∗ (-7.90)
∆ ln yt−2 -0.422∗∗∗ (-10.06) -0.406∗∗∗ (-10.08) -0.407∗∗∗ (-10.80) -0.293∗∗∗ (-6.96)
∆ ln yt−3 -0.196∗∗∗ (-4.07) -0.192∗∗∗ (-4.27) -0.196∗∗∗ (-4.78) -0.106∗∗ (-2.32)
∆ ln yt−4 -0.191∗∗∗ (-5.87) -0.181∗∗∗ (-5.91) -0.169∗∗∗ (-5.28) -0.202∗∗∗ (-4.43)
∆ ln yt−5 -0.155∗∗∗ (-5.78) -0.145∗∗∗ (-5.69) -0.154∗∗∗ (-4.95) -0.109∗∗∗ (-3.66)
∆rt−1 -3.055 (-0.24) -2.19 (-0.17) 2.977 (-0.22) 8.894 (1.35)
∆rt−2 19.41 (-1.67) 18.29 (-1.56) 16.81 (-1.47) 13.98 (1.03)
∆rt−3 29.66∗∗∗ (-3.89) 30.30∗∗∗ (-3.88) 32.76∗∗∗ (-3.54) 23.49∗∗∗ (3.22)
∆rt−4 -7.253 (-1.20) -9.887 (-1.40) -10.68 (-1.18) -10.55 (-1.35)
∆rt−5 20.69∗∗ (-2.46) 20.16∗∗ (-2.4) 23.22∗∗ (-2.6) 5.246 (0.50)
∆rt−6 -18.51∗∗ (-2.64) -21.14∗∗ (-2.68) -21.31∗∗ (-2.56) -24.61∗∗ (-2.08)
Tech.Eff.t−1 ∗∆rt−1 6.618 (-0.38) 6.148 (-0.34) -1.479 (-0.08) -4.411 (-0.47)
Tech.Eff.t−1 ∗∆rt−2 -33.12∗∗ (-2.06) -32.11∗ (-1.98) -31.19∗ (-1.88) -22.07 (-1.15)
Tech.Eff.t−1 ∗∆rt−3 -32.59∗∗∗ (-2.99) -33.50∗∗∗ (-3.01) -39.03∗∗∗ (-2.86) -19.32∗ (-1.93)
Tech.Eff.t−1 ∗∆rt−4 -1.456 (-0.16) 1.832 (-0.18) 3.662 (-0.28) -5.668 (-0.49)
Tech.Eff.t−1 ∗∆rt−5 -15.42 (-1.34) -14.7 (-1.28) -14.32 (-1.21) 2.246 (0.15)
Tech.Eff.t−1 ∗∆rt−6 14.87 (-1.48) 18.47 (-1.63) 19.72 (-1.65) 23.37 (1.41)
π 8.241∗∗∗ (-3.92) 8.531∗∗∗ (-3.77) 9.602∗∗∗ (-4.56) 2.639 (1.16)
∆ ln IPIt−1 -1.245∗∗∗ (-7.08) -1.199∗∗∗ (-6.74) -1.238∗∗∗ (-5.46) -1.819∗∗∗ (-9.92)
∆ ln IPIt−2 -2.090∗∗∗ (-8.02) -2.144∗∗∗ (-8.21) -2.145∗∗∗ (-6.90) -2.740∗∗∗ (-11.86)
∆ ln IPIt−3 -0.977∗∗∗ (-5.17) -0.978∗∗∗ (-5.20) -0.936∗∗∗ (-4.58) -1.596∗∗∗ (-8.11)
∆ ln IPIt−4 -1.192∗∗∗ (-10.24) -1.229∗∗∗ (-10.05) -1.203∗∗∗ (-7.53) -1.750∗∗∗ (-9.37)
∆ ln IPIt−5 -0.579∗∗∗ (-4.38) -0.608∗∗∗ (-4.42) -0.513∗∗ (-2.43) -1.204∗∗∗ (-5.75)
∆ ln IPIt−6 0.00877 (-0.1) 0.00128 (-0.01) 0.104 (-0.71) -0.158 (-1.11)
MA 0.237∗∗ (-2.3) 0.238∗∗ (-2.31) 0.264∗ (-1.99)
Tax -0.609∗∗∗ (-6.35) -0.633∗∗∗ (-6.85) -0.673∗∗∗ (-6.81) -0.249∗∗∗ (-3.74)
Q2 0.328∗∗∗ (-7.18) 0.329∗∗∗ (-6.82) 0.364∗∗∗ (-6.36) 0.284∗∗∗ (8.26)
Q3 0.360∗∗∗ (-8.89) 0.366∗∗∗ (-8.66) 0.398∗∗∗ (-9.36) 0.358∗∗∗ (11.17)
Q4 0.440∗∗∗ (-10.15) 0.443∗∗∗ (-9.83) 0.507∗∗∗ (-10.56) 0.371∗∗∗ (10.64)
Constant -0.278∗∗∗ (-8.00) -0.280∗∗∗ (-7.58) -0.316∗∗∗ (-8.35) -0.211∗∗∗ (-7.64)
N 2,860 2,860 2,822 2,606
Note: t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. The table presents
the estimated coefficients (and the t statistics, of a robust fixed-effects estimation of equa-
tion 20, where B takes the values of Technical Efficiency. The dependent variable is the
growth rate of disbursements. Regression (1) considers total disbursements (the sum of
commercial, consumer and micro-credits disbursements), regression (2) the sum of con-
sumer and commercial disbursements, regression (3) and (4) consider commercial and
consumer disbursements, accordingly.
Also, from table 6, with a confidence level of 1%, the sum of the coeffi-
cients of a shock in the TIB rate is negative for Commercial and Consumer
disbursements, meaning that a rise in the TIB rate, reduces the growth
rate of these disbursements. The growth rate of consumer and commercial
disbursements would fall 1.9 percentage points each, after a 1 percentage
point increase in the TIB rate. Anyway, evidence of a bank-lending chan-
nel for consumer loans is weaker (only at a 10% level). It is possible that
consumer loans show a weaker sensitivity to monetary policy rate inter-
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ventions, because they account for a much smaller portion of the bank’s
total loans, so it is easier for banks to keep stable their loanable resources
available for these lines of credit. In other words, it is possible that while
demand for consumer loans could be more elastic, the supply of this type
of credit is more inelastic.
Table 6. Summary of Total Effects
Heterogeneity Type of Sum of coefficients of ∆r Sum of coefficients of ∆r ×B
B disbursements y < 10% < 5% < 1% < 10% < 5% < 1%
Total -3.263 0.468 0.468
No Consumer&Commercial -4.174 -4.174 -0.06
heterogeneity Commercial -1.925 -1.925 2.66
Consumer -1.945 0.323 0.323
Total 31.84 31.84 29.661 -65.706 -65.706 -32.59
Technical Consumer&Commercial 29.328 29.328 30.303 -65.61 -33.498 -33.498
Efficiency Commercial 34.674 34.674 32.762 -70.226 -39.032 -39.032
Consumer -1.125 -1.125 23.488 -19.323 0 0
Total -5.902 -9.003 -14.653 499.819 778.431 778.431
Operational Consumer&Commercial -5.453 -8.47 -14.598 463.567 766.33 766.33
Efficiency Commercial -4.585 -4.585 -10.607 456.786 795.754 795.754
Consumer -2.068 -2.068 -11.953 287.628 287.628 287.628
Total -3.64 -0.027 -0.027 0 0 0
∆ Financial Consumer&Commercial -1.918 -0.61 -0.61 0 0 0
Efficiency Commercial -2.461 2.265 2.265 0 0 0
Consumer -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 73.803 0 0
Total -3.097 -3.097 1.216 264.587 121.164 0
∆ Returns Consumer&Commercial -4.05 -4.05 -4.05 99.104 0 0
to Scale Commercial -1.722 -1.722 -1.672 115.771 0 0
Consumer -1.389 -1.389 -1.389 0 0 0
Total -3.212 -3.212 0.253 -437.484 -437.484 0
∆ Capitalization Consumer&Commercial -4.172 -4.172 -0.283 -442.964 -442.964 0
Commercial -1.943 -1.943 2.514 -407.752 -407.752 0
Consumer -0.397 -0.397 -0.397 -211.244 -498.984 0
Total -1.257 0.251 0.251 -121.895 -121.895 -121.895
∆ Liquidity Consumer&Commercial -1.593 -4.293 -0.249 -118.674 -118.674 0
Commercial -1.995 -1.995 2.604 -124.942 -124.942 -124.942
Consumer -0.573 -0.573 -0.573 -79.269 0 0
Total -0.81 -0.81 -0.81 -2.367 -2.367 -2.367
Lerner Consumer&Commercial -1.463 -1.463 -1.463 -2.14 -2.14 -2.14
Index Commercial -2.662 -2.662 -2.662 -0.02 -0.02 3.173
Consumer 33.231 33.231 33.231 -33.299 -33.299 -33.299
Note: Total effects are the sum of the coefficients of the lagged variable and interactions
if they are statistically significant at least at a 10%, 5% or 1% level. These coefficients
represent the effect of increasing r in one unit (for example from 0.05 to 1.05), so if one
wants to analyze the effect of increasing the TIB in 1 percentage point (from 0.05 to 0.06),
which is more aligned with a monetary policy shock, these coefficients must be read as
percentage points over the growth rate of disbursements (for example a coefficient of -3.2
means -3.2 percentage points).
Introducing the interaction of changes in the TIB rate with heteroge-
neous characteristics of banks, there is evidence suggesting the transmis-
sion of monetary policy depends on these characteristics, as can be seen
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in table 6. There is evidence suggesting efficiency (measured as techni-
cal efficiency and operational efficiency), market power (measured with
the Lerner index) and liquidity are important determinants of the speed
and power of the bank-lending channel. Although there is also evidence
that capitalization and returns to scale are determinants of the transmis-
sion mechanism, there is almost none for financial efficiency.
Table 7. Total Effect on the Average Bank
Heterogeneity B Type of disbursements y
Variable name Mean Total Consumer&Commercial Commercial Consumer
No Heterogeneity NA -3.263 -4.174 -1.925 -1.945
Technical Efficiency 0.7013 -14.241 -16.685 -14.577 -14.677
Operational Efficiency 0.01928 3.736 3.486 4.223 3.479
∆ Financial Efficiency 0.000315 -3.64 -1.918 -2.461 0.018
∆ Returns to Scale -0.000119 -3.128 -4.062 -1.736 -1.389
∆ Capitalization 0.000057 -3.237 -4.197 -1.967 -0.409
∆ Liquidity 0.000103 -1.269 -1.606 -2.007 -0.581
Lerner Index 0.76871 -2.629 -3.107 -2.677 7.633
Note: To calculate the total effect of a monetary policy shock on the average bank, this study
considers the total effects at a 10% level, presented on table 6, and the mean of the het-
erogeneity variable, for each type of disbursements. Total disbursements are the sum of
Consumer, Commercial and Micro-credit disbursements.
The total effect of technical efficiency on the sensitivity of disburse-
ments to shocks in the TIB rate is negative, as expected from the theo-
retical model presented in subsection 7.1. This effect is consistent for all
types of disbursements, although it is significantly weaker for consumer
disbursements. These results suggest that when cost-efficiency increases,
the response of disbursements to an increase in the TIB rate is more nega-
tive (the reaction is greater or faster). Additionally, monetary policy may
significantly lose its power to impact the lending market through banks
when they are highly inefficient, considering the direct effect of the shock
is positive (after controlling for technical efficiency) and lower (in absolute
value) than the indirect shock.
The efficiency of the average bank is 70.13%. For this bank, a 1 percentage
point increase in the TIB rate would reduce the growth rate of total dis-
bursements 14.2 percentage points and of commercial disbursements 14.5
percentage points. Moreover, from table 5, the only statistically significant
coefficients of ∆r were the third, fifth and sixth lags, and the second and
third lag for the interaction terms. This suggests that technical efficiency
affects the transmission mechanism through the decision-making process
of corporate governance, that may be broadly defined on a quarterly basis.
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The three biggest banks in Colombia, which also had the highest market
shares in the loans market as of 2014, show lower levels of technical effi-
ciency than the average bank, so the power of monetary policy transmitted
through the bank lending channel may be significantly affected.
Regarding the balance-sheet measures of efficiency, operational and finan-
cial efficiency, the results of the first variable are consistent with the tech-
nical efficiency results, but financial efficiency is generally not significant.
Operational efficiency, which is the ratio of total operating expenses to total
assets, must be interpreted as an inefficiency measure (higher values indi-
cate higher inefficiency). Then, the results suggest that more inefficient
banks will react less or slower to an increase in the interbank rate than ef-
ficient banks, for all types of disbursements. Also, the effect is smaller for
consumer loans than it is for total or commercial loans. The average bank
shows an operational efficiency ratio of 0.019, and the total effect of a shock
to the interbank rate is positive for all types of disbursements (see table 7).
Lower levels of this measure would increase the power of the transmission
mechanism.
The financial efficiency ratio, which is the ratio of non-interest operating
expenses over total income, does not explain heterogeneous reactions to
monetary policy shocks21. This shows that this balance-sheet measure of
efficiency does not consider the cost structure of the organization and does
not seem to determine decisions regarding the supply of loans. This mea-
sure leaves out information that is relevant to the decision-making process
of banks. The technical efficiency measures from the Stochastic Frontier
Analysis, consider various dimensions that cannot be included using bal-
ance sheet ratios.
Returns to scale was also included in differences because it was not station-
ary in levels. The interaction coefficients with this variable are significant
for total, consumer and commercial, and commercial disbursements at a
10% level and only for the first lag. The total effect is positive, meaning
that higher returns to scale reduces or slows the reaction of disbursements
to monetary policy in the subsequent months after the shock. The sensitiv-
ity of disbursements of consumer loans to monetary policy shocks is not
affected by the level of returns to scale. These results make sense consid-
ering that if there is an increase in the TIB rate, the growth rate of total
21The financial efficiency variable had to be included in differences because it was not
stationary in levels.
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disbursements falls (because the direct effect of the monetary policy shock
is negative for all types of credit), but the fall is slower for bank’s whose
costs are reduced by increasing their total loans, although consumer loans
are not heterogeneously affected. Bank’s with increasing returns to scale
should have fewer incentives to reduce loan supply even if they see an in-
crease in the cost of loanable resources if total costs are reduced. Because
consumer loans are such a smaller portion of total loans, their supply may
be less sensitive to different levels of RTS.
Regarding heterogeneity due to capitalization and liquidity, the results are
different to what has been found in the literature for Colombia (Gómez-
González & Grosz, 2007). Higher capitalization and higher liquidity im-
pact disbursements growth rate negatively after a positive monetary pol-
icy shock, for all types of credit. Results suggest that more capitalized and
liquid banks will react faster to changes in the TIB rate, although it was
expected for these banks to react slower since capitalization and liquidity
would let them replace loanable funds after the shock. This result is worth
exploring more closely in further studies. The coefficients for the interac-
tion with liquidity are only significant in the first lag, and for capitalization
in the fifth and fourth lag, showing that capitalization is a determinant for
the effect of changes in further changes of the TIB rate, but liquidity deter-
mines the effect of short-term monetary policy shocks. Anyhow, the total
effect for the average bank, after accounting for the indirect effect of capital-
ization and liquidity, is still negative (the bank-lending channel is present).
Evidence of heterogeneous transmission of monetary policy due to market
power, measured with the Lerner index, is rather interesting. This vari-
able is statistically significant at a 1% level for all types of disbursements.
The total effect on the growth rate of disbursements after a positive mon-
etary policy shock, for the average bank, is negative for total and commer-
cial loans, but it is positive for consumer loans (see table 7). These results
suggest that banks with higher market power reduce the growth rate of
disbursements after an increase in the interbank rate, faster than banks
with less market power. Although previous literature suggested the effect
would be opposite ((Baglioni, 2007), (Brissimis & Delis, 2010)), there could
be an intuitive reason. Consider a contractionary monetary policy shock,
if the policy rate rises, intermediation costs also rise and banks loanable re-
sources become costlier, so banks that have greater market power will have
incentives to impact their supply of loans faster without affecting their mar-
ket share. On the other hand, if there is an expansionary policy, the cost
of funding falls, and then, although they would have incentives to increase
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their loans supply, they could be willing to take advantage of their market
power keeping higher intermediation spreads. Thus, there could be a het-
erogeneous response to contractionary and expansionary policies that we
are not observing, related banks’ market power. This should be studied in
further research.
Finally, considering policy implications of these results, the main conclu-
sion that could be drawn from this study, is that the Central Bank should
evaluate how banking regulation may affect cost structures. As there is ev-
idence that higher efficiency in the banking sector increases the power of
transmission of monetary policy, it is desirable to design regulations that
reduce administrative costs and that promote healthy levels of liquidity
and capitalization, while carefully limiting or monitoring bank’s credit ex-
posure. Also, it should be considered that Colombia’s regulation is some-
what lagging in relationship to technology advancements and innovations
in the capitals markets and the financial industry, which could negatively
affect banks’ efficiency in the future. Furthermore, the preliminary results
on market power indicate regulation in this matter should consider its ef-
fects on total surplus, but it seems that higher market power may increase
the power of monetary policy. This last result should definitely be studied
more closely.
9. Conclusions
This study evaluates the existence of a bank-lending channel of monetary
policy in Colombia and finds evidence that this transmission mechanism
exists and is heterogeneous, depending on bank-specific characteristics.
To analyze this, this study uses monthly balance-sheet data reported to
the Financial Supervisor in Colombia, SFC (Superintendencia Financiera de
Colombia), for banks from 2002 to 2014. The methodology followed con-
sists, broadly speaking, of two steps. First, the estimation of different bank-
specific characteristics and then, the evaluation of the presence of a bank-
lending channel, and its dependence on these characteristics.
In the first step, this study considers seven measures of bank heterogeneity:
technical (cost) efficiency, returns to scale (RTS), the Lerner index (to proxy
market power), capitalization, liquidity, operational efficiency and finan-
cial efficiency. Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) is used to estimate a cost
function for banks, and to estimate technical efficiency. With the estimated
cost function, it was possible to estimate RTS and the marginal cost of loans,
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so the Lerner index could also be estimated. Furthermore, banks’ balance-
sheet data is used to calculate ratios for capitalization, liquidity, opera-
tional efficiency and financial efficiency. Second, this study models the
growth rate of total (the sum of commercial, consumer and micro-credits)
disbursements, the sum of commercial and consumer disbursements, and
commercial and consumer disbursements individually, using changes in
the interbank overnight rate (TIB), macroeconomic and other controls, and
the interaction of these bank-specific characteristics with changes in the TIB
rate. The TIB rate is considered a proxy for monetary policy because it is
highly correlated with the policy rate (TIP)22.
The findings of this study are twofold. The first are related to hetero-
geneity in the banking sector in Colombia, and the second, to the het-
erogeneous transmission of monetary policy through the banking sector.
Mainly, this study finds statistically significant evidence of technical inef-
ficiency in Colombia’s banks. Also, there is evidence of a bank-lending
channel that is heterogeneously determined by bank efficiency. Technical
efficiency, operational efficiency, market power and liquidity are impor-
tant determinants of the speed and power of the transmission of monetary
policy through the lending market. Although there is also evidence that
capitalization and RTS are determinants of the transmission mechanism,
there is almost no evidence for financial efficiency.
Technical efficiency is determined by bank-specific characteristics, and fail-
ing to account for this fact could result in biased estimators. Size (total as-
sets), liquidity and capitalization levels, and credit risk are important de-
terminants of banks’ cost efficiency. The average measure of efficiency for
Colombia’s banking sector is 70.13%, a result that is aligned with previous
studies (Almanza-Ramı́rez, 2012; Fernández & Estrada, 2013; Sarmiento
et al., 2014). Furthermore, the period from 2005 to 2007, (when several
events of mergers and acquisitions happened), was a period of high cost ef-
ficiency. The 2008 crisis affected banks’ technical efficiency, but it increased
after 2010 (where several new banks entered the industry).
Also, there is evidence that the banking sector exhibits, in general, decreas-
ing RTS (with an average measure of 0.89). The average Lerner Index was
0.769, which shows evidence of high market power of banks in the loans
market. The biggest banks show average values of the Lerner index close
to or higher than the average value of the whole sample, but small banks
22The TIP is not used directly because it exhibits too little variation.
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show the highest values, probably because many of them are concentrated
in the consumer segment, where clients have less market power. Big banks
show higher mean values of liquidity compared to the others, but small
banks are the most capitalized, in general.
Regarding the monetary policy transmission, the estimations without het-
erogeneity suggest there is a bank-lending channel in Colombia, particu-
larly through commercial loans. The estimated total effect of a shock in the
TIB rate is negative. The results indicate the growth rate of total disburse-
ments would fall 3.26 percentage points after a 1 percentage point increase
in the TIB rate. The growth rate of consumer and commercial disburse-
ments would fall 1.9 percentage points each, after a 1 percentage point
increase in the TIB rate. Also, the effect of a shock in the TIB rate is not
immediate, it takes at least two or three months to impact disbursements.
The transmission mechanism is weaker through consumer loans, probably
because they account for a much smaller portion of the bank’s total loans,
so it is possible that their supply is more inelastic.
Furthermore, introducing the interaction of changes in the TIB rate with
bank-specific characteristics gives statistically significant evidence of het-
erogeneous transmission of monetary policy. The total effect of techni-
cal efficiency on the sensitivity of disbursements to shocks in the TIB rate
is negative. When cost-efficiency increases, the negative response of the
growth rate of disbursements to an increase in the TIB rate is faster. Ad-
ditionally, monetary policy may significantly lose its power to impact the
lending market through banks when they are highly inefficient, consider-
ing the direct effect of the shock is positive (after controlling for technical
efficiency) and lower (in absolute value) than the indirect shock. Moreover,
the three biggest banks in Colombia, which also had the highest market
shares in the loans market as of 2014, show lower levels of technical effi-
ciency than the average bank, so the power of monetary policy transmitted
through the bank lending channel may be significantly affected.
Regarding the operational and financial efficiency ratios, the effects of the
first are aligned with those of technical efficiency, but the second is gen-
erally not significant. These measures are simplistic and may leave out
relevant information on the banks’ cost structure, that is gathered by the
technical efficiency measure. Financial efficiency, particularly, seems to be
biased because it does not seem to determine decisions regarding the sup-
ply of loans, while the other two measures do. Analysts and policymakers
should consider these flaws when taking decisions using these ratios.
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RTS is significant in determining the transmission of monetary policy through
both consumer and commercial loans. A higher measure of RTS reduces or
slows the reaction of disbursements to monetary policy in the subsequent
months after the shock. Also, regarding heterogeneity due to capitaliza-
tion and liquidity, the evidence is different to what has been found in other
studies for Colombia (Gómez-González & Grosz, 2007). Higher capitaliza-
tion and higher liquidity impact disbursements growth rate negatively af-
ter a positive monetary policy shock, for all types of credit, meaning that
more capitalized and liquid banks will react faster to changes in the TIB
rate. Finally, the Lerner index, as a measure of market power, is highly sig-
nificant to explain heterogeneous response of all types of disbursements.
Banks with higher market power reduce the growth rate of disbursements
after an increase in the interbank rate, faster than banks with less market
power, contrary to what is suggested in the literature (Baglioni, 2007; Bris-
simis & Delis, 2010).
Considering these findings, Central Banks should evaluate how banking
regulation may affect cost structures. This may affect the power of mone-
tary policy by weakening or strengthening one of its transmission mech-
anisms. It will be desirable to design regulations that reduce administra-
tive costs and that promote healthy levels of liquidity and capitalization,
while carefully limiting or monitoring bank’s credit exposure. Considering
Colombia’s regulation is lagging in regards of technological advancements
and innovations in the financial industry, this could be negatively affecting
power of monetary policy due to inefficiencies in the banking sector. Also,
the preliminary findings on market power indicate that regulation in this
matter should consider its effects on welfare, but it seems that higher mar-
ket power may improve the transmission mechanism of monetary policy.
This last conclusion should be tested more closely in further studies.
Finally, this study explores heterogeneous transmission of monetary pol-
icy considering bank-specific characteristics that had not been considered
for the Colombian case and it is, to my knowledge, one of the few studies to
consider the relationship between technical efficiency and monetary pol-
icy transmission. However, there are certain points that could be explored
deeper and weaknesses that should be addressed in further studies.
Regarding the technical efficiency measure,profit efficiency should also be
considered as a possible determinant for the transmission mechanism. Also,
the methodology followed in this study to identify the bank-lending chan-
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nel has an identification issue. Loans disbursements may be considered an
approximation of the equilibrium quantity of loans demand and supply,
but it is not possible to observe supply of loans directly. Furthermore, there
could be endogeneity with the heterogeneity variables, and the results of
the effects of the Lerner index, capitalization and liquidity deserve further
analysis. To do this, it would be desirable to evaluate if there is a differen-
tiated response to contractionary and expansive monetary policy shocks.
Finally, size could also be included as a bank-specific characteristic, and an
heterogeneous transmission of monetary policy through interest rates of
different credit products could also be explored in further analysis.
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Annexes
A. Summary - Monetary Policy Transmission in Colombia










The reaction of credit and
deposits interest rates, af-
ter monetary policy shocks,
is heterogeneous between




Reaction is heterogeneous. In the deposits market,
the maximum response is observed after 6 months, an
increase in the policy rate results in proportional in-
crease of the market rate proportionally. In the credit
market, the maximum response is observed after 4.4
months, but some banks increase their rates more
than the policy decision. The reaction is higher for
credits than deposits. In the short-run, the variance
of interest rates is driven by the interbank rate, but in










tions affect credits and de-
posits interests of banks.
2001-
2004
Changes in the monetary policy intervention rate di-
rectly impact short-term interest rates in the credit
market (TIB and REPO rates). Treasury and prefer-
ential loans, and deposits’ interest rates are affected
directly by the TIB rate. Changes in the DTF (de-












There is a short-term and
long-term relationship be-
tween the TIB rate (credits)
and the DTF rate (deposits),




A monetary policy shock affects the TIB more than the
DTF. An increase of 100 basis points in the interven-
tion rate generates a 68 basis points increase in the TIB
rate, that stabilizes in 38 basis points. The effect on the














A positive shock to the policy rate reduces the growth-
rate of commercial loans (only). Capitalization and
liquidity reinforce this channel (the fall is higher for






Monetary policy shocks im-
pact banks’ willingness to
bear risk, through the im-
pact on balance-sheet data,
affecting the transmission
through the credit market.
2000-
2008
After expansive shocks, banks are more tolerant to
lower quality loans and the perceived risk of outstand-
ing loans is reduced. Hazard rates increase when the
policy rate increases, and decrease when the policy
rate is reduced. Bigger banks exhibit lower loan risk
(lower hazard rates), but hazard rates increase when
banks are more dependable on the interbank market








The impact of monetary
policy on the interest rates




The transmission of monetary policy to interest rates
in the credit market is complete after 8 months and
is heterogeneous by type of loans and maturities.
Bank-specific characteristics are not significant deter-
minants of this response. Interest rates of commercial
loans (particularly preferential loans) are more sensi-
tive than consumer interest rates. Credit cards and
mortgage loans are less sensitive (they are constrained
by regulatory limits or price stickiness).
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B. Monetary Policy and Heterogeneity Estimation Results
Table 9. No Heterogeneity
Independent Dependent variable ∆ ln yt (disbursements)
variables (1) Total (2) Consumer&Commercial (3) Commercial (4) Consumer
∆ ln yt−1 -0.550∗∗∗ (-14.12) -0.550∗∗∗ (-14.82) -0.555∗∗∗ (-16.49) -0.398∗∗∗ (-7.81)
∆ ln yt−2 -0.409∗∗∗ (-10.92) -0.397∗∗∗ (-10.94) -0.396∗∗∗ (-11.84) -0.283∗∗∗ (-6.32)
∆ ln yt−3 -0.188∗∗∗ (-4.51) -0.187∗∗∗ (-4.68) -0.188∗∗∗ (-5.11) -0.0912∗ (-1.88)
∆ ln yt−4 -0.196∗∗∗ (-6.50) -0.188∗∗∗ (-6.56) -0.174∗∗∗ (-5.77) -0.196∗∗∗ (-4.30)
∆ ln yt−5 -0.155∗∗∗ (-6.47) -0.146∗∗∗ (-6.31) -0.156∗∗∗ (-5.41) -0.107∗∗∗ (-3.59)
∆rt−1 1.743 (-1.29) 2.265 (-1.5) 2.154 (-1.29) 4.905∗∗∗ (3.92)
∆rt−2 -3.720∗∗ (-2.10) -4.121∗∗ (-2.24) -4.694∗∗ (-2.15) -1.963 (-1.36)
∆rt−3 7.687∗∗∗ (-4.71) 7.612∗∗∗ (-4.55) 6.213∗∗∗ (-3.08) 9.251∗∗∗ (6.34)
∆rt−4 -9.616∗∗∗ (-6.28) -9.928∗∗∗ (-6.03) -9.568∗∗∗ (-4.81) -13.75∗∗∗ (-7.15)
∆rt−5 9.965∗∗∗ (-4.75) 9.904∗∗∗ (-4.49) 13.03∗∗∗ (-5.13) 6.690∗∗∗ (4.77)
∆rt−6 -7.710∗∗∗ (-6.13) -7.768∗∗∗ (-6.17) -6.967∗∗∗ (-4.68) -7.547∗∗∗ (-4.24)
π 8.486∗∗∗ (-4.12) 8.749∗∗∗ (-3.95) 10.01∗∗∗ (-4.83) 2.298 (1.06)
∆ ln IPIt−1 -1.295∗∗∗ (-7.62) -1.246∗∗∗ (-7.20) -1.283∗∗∗ (-5.62) -1.834∗∗∗ (-9.60)
∆ ln IPIt−2 -2.119∗∗∗ (-8.84) -2.163∗∗∗ (-9.01) -2.159∗∗∗ (-7.45) -2.770∗∗∗ (-11.22)
∆ ln IPIt−3 -0.978∗∗∗ (-5.58) -0.970∗∗∗ (-5.53) -0.931∗∗∗ (-4.98) -1.663∗∗∗ (-8.32)
∆ ln IPIt−4 -1.154∗∗∗ (-9.22) -1.182∗∗∗ (-9.00) -1.160∗∗∗ (-6.67) -1.814∗∗∗ (-9.25)
∆ ln IPIt−5 -0.572∗∗∗ (-3.64) -0.593∗∗∗ (-3.65) -0.504∗∗ (-2.21) -1.228∗∗∗ (-5.90)
∆ ln IPIt−6 0.0409 (-0.37) 0.0356 (-0.33) 0.133 (-0.85) -0.180 (-1.31)
MA 0.237∗∗ (-2.26) 0.238∗∗ (-2.26) 0.263∗ (-1.95) 0.159 (1.61)
Tax -0.615∗∗∗ (-6.29) -0.639∗∗∗ (-6.79) -0.681∗∗∗ (-6.77) -0.250∗∗∗ (-3.86)
Q2 0.338∗∗∗ (-7.45) 0.338∗∗∗ (-7.1) 0.373∗∗∗ (-6.68) 0.285∗∗∗ (8.28)
Q3 0.361∗∗∗ (-9.64) 0.365∗∗∗ (-9.36) 0.397∗∗∗ (-10.04) 0.361∗∗∗ (11.25)
Q4 0.448∗∗∗ (-10.7) 0.450∗∗∗ (-10.34) 0.512∗∗∗ (-10.94) 0.380∗∗∗ (10.74)
Constant -0.284∗∗∗ (-8.56) -0.285∗∗∗ (-8.09) -0.321∗∗∗ (-8.91) -0.216∗∗∗ (-7.87)
N 2,958 2,958 2,920 2,669
Note: t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents
the estimated coefficients (and the t statistics, of a robust fixed-effects estimation of equa-
tion 20, where B is the Operational Efficiency ratio. The dependent variable is the growth
rate of disbursements. Regression (1) considers total disbursements (the sum of commer-
cial, consumer and micro-credits disbursements), regression (2) the sum of consumer and
commercial disbursements, regression (3) and (4) consider commercial and consumer dis-
bursements, accordingly.
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Table 10. Operational Efficiency
Independent Dependent variable ∆ ln yt (disbursements)
variables (1) Total (2) Consumer&Commercial (3) Commercial (4) Consumer
∆ ln yt−1 -0.553∗∗∗ (-14.89) -0.554∗∗∗ (-15.59) -0.558∗∗∗ (-17.09) -0.394∗∗∗ (-7.71)
∆ ln yt−2 -0.409∗∗∗ (-11.09) -0.397∗∗∗ (-11.07) -0.396∗∗∗ (-12.07) -0.282∗∗∗ (-6.19)
∆ ln yt−3 -0.186∗∗∗ (-4.54) -0.184∗∗∗ (-4.71) -0.186∗∗∗ (-5.16) -0.0936∗ (-1.98)
∆ ln yt−4 -0.194∗∗∗ (-6.52) -0.186∗∗∗ (-6.59) -0.173∗∗∗ (-5.79) -0.196∗∗∗ (-4.34)
∆ ln yt−5 -0.155∗∗∗ (-6.44) -0.146∗∗∗ (-6.30) -0.156∗∗∗ (-5.42) -0.107∗∗∗ (-3.72)
∆rt−1 5.650∗∗ (-2.5) 6.128∗∗ (-2.55) 6.022∗∗ (-2.45) 0.00970 (0.00)
∆rt−2 -9.359∗∗∗ (-4.67) -9.733∗∗∗ (-4.73) -10.25∗∗∗ (-3.85) -4.774 (-1.06)
∆rt−3 3.101∗ (-1.83) 3.017∗ (-1.75) 1.248 (-0.6) 9.067∗∗∗ (3.57)
∆rt−4 -13.53∗∗∗ (-6.02) -13.63∗∗∗ (-5.77) -13.49∗∗∗ (-5.40) -14.13∗∗∗ (-4.62)
∆rt−5 14.99∗∗∗ (-5.67) 15.31∗∗∗ (-5.32) 19.10∗∗∗ (-5.61) 9.886∗∗ (2.56)
∆rt−6 -6.746∗∗∗ (-4.39) -6.548∗∗∗ (-4.15) -5.957∗∗∗ (-3.32) -6.886∗∗ (-2.75)
Ope.Eff. ∗∆rt−1 -174.3 (-1.47) -172.3 (-1.41) -169 (-1.45) 287.6∗∗∗ (2.80)
Ope.Eff. ∗∆rt−2 317.4∗∗∗ (-4.68) 316.2∗∗∗ (-4.73) 313.9∗∗∗ (-5.07) 162.4 (0.57)
Ope.Eff. ∗∆rt−3 244.8∗∗∗ (-9.76) 246.0∗∗∗ (-10.02) 266.8∗∗∗ (-8.85) 20.61 (0.17)
Ope.Eff. ∗∆rt−4 216.2∗∗∗ (-3.42) 204.1∗∗∗ (-2.99) 215.1∗∗∗ (-3.47) 43.85 (0.30)
Ope.Eff. ∗∆rt−5 -278.6∗ (-1.79) -302.8∗ (-1.78) -339.0∗ (-1.95) -217.4 (-0.87)
Ope.Eff. ∗∆rt−6 -79.03 (-1.47) -95.27 (-1.67) -85.54 (-1.32) -42.81 (-0.25)
π 8.682∗∗∗ (-4.03) 8.917∗∗∗ (-3.89) 10.22∗∗∗ (-4.63) 2.223 (1.03)
∆ ln IPIt−1 -1.265∗∗∗ (-7.33) -1.217∗∗∗ (-6.93) -1.255∗∗∗ (-5.46) -1.822∗∗∗ (-9.92)
∆ ln IPIt−2 -2.102∗∗∗ (-8.32) -2.147∗∗∗ (-8.48) -2.148∗∗∗ (-7.08) -2.743∗∗∗ (-11.67)
∆ ln IPIt−3 -0.978∗∗∗ (-5.20) -0.973∗∗∗ (-5.16) -0.937∗∗∗ (-4.66) -1.629∗∗∗ (-8.17)
∆ ln IPIt−4 -1.159∗∗∗ (-8.53) -1.188∗∗∗ (-8.38) -1.171∗∗∗ (-6.52) -1.789∗∗∗ (-9.26)
∆ ln IPIt−5 -0.561∗∗∗ (-3.37) -0.585∗∗∗ (-3.41) -0.496∗∗ (-2.14) -1.222∗∗∗ (-5.88)
∆ ln IPIt−6 0.0256 (-0.24) 0.0189 (-0.18) 0.115 (-0.76) -0.173 (-1.30)
MA 0.239∗∗ (-2.29) 0.240∗∗ (-2.29) 0.264∗ (-1.96)
Tax -0.615∗∗∗ (-6.30) -0.639∗∗∗ (-6.78) -0.680∗∗∗ (-6.71) -0.247∗∗∗ (-3.66)
Q2 0.335∗∗∗ (-7.21) 0.335∗∗∗ (-6.89) 0.370∗∗∗ (-6.52) 0.282∗∗∗ (8.57)
Q3 0.358∗∗∗ (-9.18) 0.362∗∗∗ (-8.94) 0.395∗∗∗ (-9.58) 0.357∗∗∗ (11.31)
Q4 0.443∗∗∗ (-10.33) 0.445∗∗∗ (-9.99) 0.508∗∗∗ (-10.62) 0.373∗∗∗ (10.98)
Constant -0.283∗∗∗ (-8.32) -0.284∗∗∗ (-7.89) -0.321∗∗∗ (-8.70) -0.211∗∗∗ (-7.87)
N 2939 2939 2901 2651
Note: t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents
the estimated coefficients (and the t statistics, of a robust fixed-effects estimation of equa-
tion 20, where B is the Operational Efficiency ratio. The dependent variable is the growth
rate of disbursements. Regression (1) considers total disbursements (the sum of commer-
cial, consumer and micro-credits disbursements), regression (2) the sum of consumer and
commercial disbursements, regression (3) and (4) consider commercial and consumer dis-
bursements, accordingly.
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Table 11. Financial Efficiency
Independent Dependent variable ∆ ln yt (disbursements)
variables (1) Total (2) Consumer&Commercial (3) Commercial (4) Consumer
∆ ln yt−1 -0.548∗∗∗ (-13.76) -0.549∗∗∗ (-14.44) -0.554∗∗∗ (-16.12) -0.392∗∗∗ (-7.68)
∆ ln yt−2 -0.411∗∗∗ (-10.97) -0.400∗∗∗ (-10.98) -0.398∗∗∗ (-11.82) -0.286∗∗∗ (-6.28)
∆ ln yt−3 -0.191∗∗∗ (-4.54) -0.190∗∗∗ (-4.71) -0.190∗∗∗ (-5.13) -0.0920∗ (-1.92)
∆ ln yt−4 -0.197∗∗∗ (-6.39) -0.190∗∗∗ (-6.44) -0.175∗∗∗ (-5.72) -0.195∗∗∗ (-4.36)
∆ ln yt−5 -0.154∗∗∗ (-6.46) -0.145∗∗∗ (-6.33) -0.155∗∗∗ (-5.40) -0.105∗∗∗ (-3.66)
∆rt−1 2.14 (-1.58) 2.726∗ (-1.8) 2.653 (-1.55) 5.284∗∗∗ (3.99)
∆rt−2 -3.613∗ (-1.82) -4.033∗ (-1.95) -4.726∗ (-1.99) -2.233 (-1.50)
∆rt−3 7.646∗∗∗ (-4.76) 7.578∗∗∗ (-4.64) 6.163∗∗∗ (-3.15) 8.927∗∗∗ (5.22)
∆rt−4 -9.714∗∗∗ (-6.49) -10.07∗∗∗ (-6.25) -9.736∗∗∗ (-5.03) -13.48∗∗∗ (-6.91)
∆rt−5 10.09∗∗∗ (-4.88) 10.03∗∗∗ (-4.61) 13.24∗∗∗ (-5.27) 7.081∗∗∗ (4.94)
∆rt−6 -8.051∗∗∗ (-6.38) -8.144∗∗∗ (-6.49) -7.402∗∗∗ (-4.97) -7.814∗∗∗ (-4.09)
Fin.Eff. ∗∆rt−1 32.07 (-0.61) 29.78 (-0.54) 55.12 (-0.88) 73.80∗ (1.75)
Fin.Eff. ∗∆rt−2 64.66 (-1.4) 59.98 (-1.26) 37.56 (-0.71) 8.323 (0.17)
Fin.Eff. ∗∆rt−3 67.6 (-1.05) 87.76 (-1.2) 99.31 (-1.23) -39.86 (-0.65)
Fin.Eff. ∗∆rt−4 64.14 (-1.35) 70.01 (-1.45) 48.72 (-0.98) 84.20 (1.33)
Fin.Eff. ∗∆rt−5 -38.22 (-0.91) -31.09 (-0.74) -19.48 (-0.42) -19.82 (-0.32)
Fin.Eff. ∗∆rt−6 4.886 (-0.07) 1.753 (-0.02) 52.55 (-0.61) 128.9 (1.18)
π 8.632∗∗∗ (-4.01) 8.957∗∗∗ (-3.85) 10.23∗∗∗ (-4.68) 2.175 (0.98)
∆ ln IPIt−1 -1.289∗∗∗ (-7.68) -1.241∗∗∗ (-7.27) -1.280∗∗∗ (-5.64) -1.824∗∗∗ (-9.48)
∆ ln IPIt−2 -2.109∗∗∗ (-8.74) -2.155∗∗∗ (-8.86) -2.152∗∗∗ (-7.27) -2.729∗∗∗ (-10.99)
∆ ln IPIt−3 -0.972∗∗∗ (-5.68) -0.969∗∗∗ (-5.62) -0.937∗∗∗ (-5.08) -1.615∗∗∗ (-7.93)
∆ ln IPIt−4 -1.147∗∗∗ (-9.25) -1.177∗∗∗ (-9.09) -1.160∗∗∗ (-6.87) -1.775∗∗∗ (-8.94)
∆ ln IPIt−5 -0.565∗∗∗ (-3.60) -0.588∗∗∗ (-3.63) -0.500∗∗ (-2.23) -1.188∗∗∗ (-5.61)
∆ ln IPIt−6 0.0466 (-0.44) 0.0401 (-0.38) 0.144 (-0.93) -0.147 (-1.10)
MA 0.240∗∗ (-2.28) 0.242∗∗ (-2.29) 0.268∗ (-1.99)
Tax -0.618∗∗∗ (-6.25) -0.642∗∗∗ (-6.72) -0.683∗∗∗ (-6.68) -0.243∗∗∗ (-3.69)
Q2 0.338∗∗∗ (-7.44) 0.339∗∗∗ (-7.06) 0.375∗∗∗ (-6.67) 0.287∗∗∗ (8.49)
Q3 0.360∗∗∗ (-9.52) 0.365∗∗∗ (-9.18) 0.397∗∗∗ (-9.82) 0.361∗∗∗ (11.47)
Q4 0.446∗∗∗ (-10.73) 0.449∗∗∗ (-10.3) 0.513∗∗∗ (-10.86) 0.379∗∗∗ (10.94)
Constant -0.283∗∗∗ (-8.52) -0.285∗∗∗ (-8.01) -0.323∗∗∗ (-8.83) -0.215∗∗∗ (-7.96)
N 2,958 2,958 2,920 2,669
Note: t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents
the estimated coefficients (and the t statistics, of a robust fixed-effects estimation of equa-
tion 20, where B is the Financial Efficiency ratio. The dependent variable is the growth
rate of disbursements. Regression (1) considers total disbursements (the sum of commer-
cial, consumer and micro-credits disbursements), regression (2) the sum of consumer and




Independent Dependent variable ∆ ln yt (disbursements)
variables (1) Total (2) Consumer&Commercial (3) Commercial (4) Consumer
∆ ln yt−1 -0.552∗∗∗ (-14.48) -0.552∗∗∗ (-15.20) -0.556∗∗∗ (-16.82) -0.395∗∗∗ (-7.60)
∆ ln yt−2 -0.411∗∗∗ (-10.96) -0.398∗∗∗ (-10.96) -0.397∗∗∗ (-11.82) -0.283∗∗∗ (-6.26)
∆ ln yt−3 -0.190∗∗∗ (-4.51) -0.188∗∗∗ (-4.68) -0.188∗∗∗ (-5.10) -0.0919∗ (-1.92)
∆ ln yt−4 -0.195∗∗∗ (-6.48) -0.187∗∗∗ (-6.53) -0.173∗∗∗ (-5.72) -0.197∗∗∗ (-4.37)
∆ ln yt−5 -0.154∗∗∗ (-6.46) -0.145∗∗∗ (-6.34) -0.154∗∗∗ (-5.35) -0.108∗∗∗ (-3.57)
∆rt−1 2.147∗ (-1.78) 2.699∗ (-1.96) 2.561 (-1.64) 4.734∗∗∗ (3.86)
∆rt−2 -3.655∗ (-2.00) -4.044∗∗ (-2.14) -4.598∗∗ (-2.07) -1.987 (-1.39)
∆rt−3 7.751∗∗∗ (-4.68) 7.690∗∗∗ (-4.54) 6.276∗∗∗ (-3.04) 9.222∗∗∗ (6.26)
∆rt−4 -9.692∗∗∗ (-6.70) -9.998∗∗∗ (-6.37) -9.641∗∗∗ (-5.10) -14.01∗∗∗ (-7.14)
∆rt−5 10.02∗∗∗ (-4.82) 9.944∗∗∗ (-4.54) 13.09∗∗∗ (-5.19) 6.980∗∗∗ (4.82)
∆rt−6 -7.830∗∗∗ (-6.13) -7.885∗∗∗ (-6.17) -7.126∗∗∗ (-4.75) -7.496∗∗∗ (-4.19)
∆Liquidity ∗∆rt−1 -121.9∗∗∗ (-2.97) -118.7∗∗ (-2.70) -124.9∗∗∗ (-2.87) 20.60 (0.25)
∆Liquidity ∗∆rt−2 -9.624 (-0.20) -15.34 (-0.30) -31.19 (-0.55) 5.416 (0.09)
∆Liquidity ∗∆rt−3 52.14 (-0.81) 56.31 (-0.86) 45.85 (-0.64) -66.40 (-0.84)
∆Liquidity ∗∆rt−4 48.49 (-0.77) 39.56 (-0.62) 49.62 (-0.75) 112.9 (1.59)
∆Liquidity ∗∆rt−5 -80.66 (-1.50) -81.82 (-1.47) -67.24 (-1.15) -79.27∗ (-1.74)
∆Liquidity ∗∆rt−6 52.6 (-0.93) 61.25 (-1.03) 48.42 (-0.72) -13.99 (-0.23)
π 8.575∗∗∗ (-3.96) 8.847∗∗∗ (-3.81) 10.05∗∗∗ (-4.57) 2.309 (1.07)
∆ ln IPIt−1 -1.282∗∗∗ (-7.62) -1.233∗∗∗ (-7.18) -1.270∗∗∗ (-5.57) -1.835∗∗∗ (-9.50)
∆ ln IPIt−2 -2.104∗∗∗ (-9.00) -2.148∗∗∗ (-9.17) -2.142∗∗∗ (-7.50) -2.756∗∗∗ (-11.15)
∆ ln IPIt−3 -0.968∗∗∗ (-5.67) -0.962∗∗∗ (-5.65) -0.920∗∗∗ (-5.05) -1.639∗∗∗ (-8.05)
∆ ln IPIt−4 -1.152∗∗∗ (-9.03) -1.181∗∗∗ (-8.84) -1.160∗∗∗ (-6.64) -1.794∗∗∗ (-9.07)
∆ ln IPIt−5 -0.560∗∗∗ (-3.47) -0.583∗∗∗ (-3.51) -0.494∗∗ (-2.14) -1.212∗∗∗ (-5.75)
∆ ln IPIt−6 0.0505 (-0.45) 0.0455 (-0.41) 0.141 (-0.89) -0.179 (-1.34)
MA 0.231∗∗ (-2.18) 0.232∗∗ (-2.18) 0.257∗ (-1.9)
Tax -0.614∗∗∗ (-6.31) -0.639∗∗∗ (-6.81) -0.681∗∗∗ (-6.78) -0.242∗∗∗ (-3.68)
Q2 0.337∗∗∗ (-7.51) 0.337∗∗∗ (-7.16) 0.372∗∗∗ (-6.7) 0.285∗∗∗ (8.49)
Q3 0.359∗∗∗ (-9.76) 0.364∗∗∗ (-9.49) 0.395∗∗∗ (-10.16) 0.363∗∗∗ (11.46)
Q4 0.448∗∗∗ (-10.76) 0.450∗∗∗ (-10.42) 0.511∗∗∗ (-10.97) 0.379∗∗∗ (10.90)
Constant -0.285∗∗∗ (-8.51) -0.286∗∗∗ (-8.07) -0.322∗∗∗ (-8.86) -0.214∗∗∗ (-8.00)
N 2,958 2,958 2,920 2,669
Note: t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents the
estimated coefficients (and the t statistics, of a robust fixed-effects estimation of equation
20, where B is the Liquidity ratio. The dependent variable is the growth rate of disburse-
ments. Regression (1) considers total disbursements (the sum of commercial, consumer
and micro-credits disbursements), regression (2) the sum of consumer and commercial




Independent Dependent variable ∆ ln yt (disbursements)
variables (1) Total (2) Consumer&Commercial (3) Commercial (4) Consumer
∆ ln yt−1 -0.550∗∗∗ (-14.17) -0.550∗∗∗ (-14.84) -0.555∗∗∗ (-16.58) -0.394∗∗∗ (-7.65)
∆ ln yt−2 -0.408∗∗∗ (-10.81) -0.397∗∗∗ (-10.81) -0.396∗∗∗ (-11.81) -0.283∗∗∗ (-6.25)
∆ ln yt−3 -0.188∗∗∗ (-4.51) -0.186∗∗∗ (-4.68) -0.188∗∗∗ (-5.11) -0.0914∗ (-1.88)
∆ ln yt−4 -0.196∗∗∗ (-6.32) -0.188∗∗∗ (-6.37) -0.174∗∗∗ (-5.65) -0.194∗∗∗ (-4.33)
∆ ln yt−5 -0.157∗∗∗ (-6.44) -0.148∗∗∗ (-6.32) -0.157∗∗∗ (-5.39) -0.108∗∗∗ (-3.60)
∆rt−1 1.74 (-1.25) 2.261 (-1.46) 2.156 (-1.26) 4.837∗∗∗ (3.77)
∆rt−2 -3.464∗∗ (-2.05) -3.889∗∗ (-2.20) -4.457∗∗ (-2.11) -2.136 (-1.47)
∆rt−3 7.651∗∗∗ (-4.71) 7.552∗∗∗ (-4.53) 6.094∗∗∗ (-3.03) 9.302∗∗∗ (6.08)
∆rt−4 -9.945∗∗∗ (-6.39) -10.26∗∗∗ (-6.15) -9.895∗∗∗ (-4.88) -13.72∗∗∗ (-7.31)
∆rt−5 10.34∗∗∗ (-4.93) 10.29∗∗∗ (-4.66) 13.40∗∗∗ (-5.22) 6.752∗∗∗ (4.52)
∆rt−6 -7.790∗∗∗ (-6.43) -7.863∗∗∗ (-6.48) -7.080∗∗∗ (-4.83) -7.564∗∗∗ (-4.04)
∆Capital. ∗∆rt−1 55.9 (-0.42) 36.16 (-0.25) 49.62 (-0.3) 287.7∗ (1.82)
∆Capital. ∗∆rt−2 -135.5 (-1.21) -109.2 (-0.95) -144.1 (-0.94) 64.78 (0.21)
∆Capital. ∗∆rt−3 -38.34 (-0.21) -43.92 (-0.24) 12.76 (-0.06) 261.5 (1.49)
∆Capital. ∗∆rt−4 123.1 (-0.48) 151.3 (-0.6) 108.3 (-0.4) -499.0∗∗ (-2.39)
∆Capital. ∗∆rt−5 -437.5∗∗ (-2.69) -443.0∗∗ (-2.69) -407.8∗∗ (-2.37) -234.8 (-0.52)
∆Capital. ∗∆rt−6 100.4 (-0.53) 123.9 (-0.59) 119.9 (-0.55) -245.8 (-0.92)
π 8.468∗∗∗ (-4.15) 8.727∗∗∗ (-3.98) 10.01∗∗∗ (-4.91) 2.322 (1.06)
∆ ln IPIt−1 -1.300∗∗∗ (-7.58) -1.251∗∗∗ (-7.15) -1.290∗∗∗ (-5.59) -1.857∗∗∗ (-9.72)
∆ ln IPIt−2 -2.121∗∗∗ (-8.76) -2.164∗∗∗ (-8.92) -2.163∗∗∗ (-7.36) -2.792∗∗∗ (-11.59)
∆ ln IPIt−3 -0.983∗∗∗ (-5.57) -0.975∗∗∗ (-5.53) -0.936∗∗∗ (-5.00) -1.657∗∗∗ (-8.24)
∆ ln IPIt−4 -1.150∗∗∗ (-8.81) -1.178∗∗∗ (-8.51) -1.154∗∗∗ (-6.42) -1.786∗∗∗ (-9.03)
∆ ln IPIt−5 -0.562∗∗∗ (-3.53) -0.585∗∗∗ (-3.55) -0.494∗∗ (-2.13) -1.191∗∗∗ (-5.79)
∆ ln IPIt−6 0.0446 (-0.41) 0.0389 (-0.36) 0.139 (-0.87) -0.154 (-1.14)
MA 0.236∗∗ (-2.21) 0.237∗∗ (-2.2) 0.263∗ (-1.91)
Tax -0.615∗∗∗ (-6.27) -0.639∗∗∗ (-6.78) -0.681∗∗∗ (-6.75) -0.241∗∗∗ (-3.68)
Q2 0.341∗∗∗ (-7.47) 0.340∗∗∗ (-7.1) 0.377∗∗∗ (-6.61) 0.293∗∗∗ (8.82)
Q3 0.362∗∗∗ (-9.57) 0.366∗∗∗ (-9.3) 0.398∗∗∗ (-9.97) 0.365∗∗∗ (11.83)
Q4 0.449∗∗∗ (-10.72) 0.451∗∗∗ (-10.34) 0.514∗∗∗ (-10.84) 0.383∗∗∗ (11.17)
Constant -0.285∗∗∗ (-8.56) -0.287∗∗∗ (-8.09) -0.323∗∗∗ (-8.82) -0.218∗∗∗ (-8.22)
N 2,958 2,958 2,920 2,669
Note: t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents
the estimated coefficients (and the t statistics, of a robust fixed-effects estimation of equa-
tion 20, where B is the Capitalization ratio. The dependent variable is the growth rate of
disbursements. Regression (1) considers total disbursements (the sum of commercial, con-
sumer and micro-credits disbursements), regression (2) the sum of consumer and com-
mercial disbursements, regression (3) and (4) consider commercial and consumer dis-
bursements, accordingly.
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Table 14. Returns to Scale
Independent Dependent variable ∆ ln yt (disbursements)
variables (1) Total (2) Consumer&Commercial (3) Commercial (4) Consumer
∆ ln yt−1 -0.563∗∗∗ (-14.57) -0.561∗∗∗ (-15.24) -0.565∗∗∗ (-16.39) -0.393∗∗∗ (-7.63)
∆ ln yt−2 -0.412∗∗∗ (-9.57) -0.399∗∗∗ (-9.64) -0.401∗∗∗ (-10.58) -0.287∗∗∗ (-6.09)
∆ ln yt−3 -0.181∗∗∗ (-3.93) -0.180∗∗∗ (-4.12) -0.187∗∗∗ (-4.62) -0.0955∗ (-1.94)
∆ ln yt−4 -0.185∗∗∗ (-5.70) -0.178∗∗∗ (-5.91) -0.165∗∗∗ (-5.11) -0.201∗∗∗ (-4.26)
∆ ln yt−5 -0.143∗∗∗ (-6.02) -0.136∗∗∗ (-6.15) -0.147∗∗∗ (-4.96) -0.110∗∗∗ (-3.62)
∆rt−1 1.385 (-0.97) 1.885 (-1.23) 1.873 (-0.97) 5.445∗∗∗ (4.15)
∆rt−2 -4.313∗∗ (-2.53) -4.858∗∗ (-2.73) -5.612∗∗ (-2.62) -0.739 (-0.52)
∆rt−3 7.252∗∗∗ (-4.3) 7.140∗∗∗ (-4.11) 5.562∗∗ (-2.53) 10.04∗∗∗ (7.14)
∆rt−4 -8.067∗∗∗ (-5.20) -8.506∗∗∗ (-4.99) -8.111∗∗∗ (-3.71) -14.51∗∗∗ (-8.22)
∆rt−5 9.788∗∗∗ (-5.36) 9.829∗∗∗ (-5.05) 13.13∗∗∗ (-5.39) 6.839∗∗∗ (4.46)
∆rt−6 -7.757∗∗∗ (-6.27) -7.654∗∗∗ (-6.07) -6.696∗∗∗ (-4.71) -9.210∗∗∗ (-5.31)
∆RTS ∗∆rt−1 121.2∗∗ (-2.58) 99.10∗ (-1.73) 115.8∗ (-1.8) -13.78 (-0.32)
∆RTS ∗∆rt−2 -54.91 (-1.44) -39.23 (-0.90) -10.65 (-0.18) 35.64 (0.69)
∆RTS ∗∆rt−3 32.12 (-0.43) 43.45 (-0.53) 23.94 (-0.24) 55.69 (0.95)
∆RTS ∗∆rt−4 -73.89 (-1.15) -26.13 (-0.29) -46.45 (-0.46) -92.39 (-1.39)
∆RTS ∗∆rt−5 143.4∗ (-2.02) 115.6 (-1.41) 92.1 (-0.98) 19.89 (0.34)
∆RTS ∗∆rt−6 -130.7 (-1.33) -166.3 (-1.56) -163.3 (-1.33) 53.52 (0.67)
π 7.860∗∗∗ (-3.95) 8.194∗∗∗ (-3.82) 9.081∗∗∗ (-4.69) 2.399 (1.02)
∆ ln IPIt−1 -1.284∗∗∗ (-7.51) -1.229∗∗∗ (-6.97) -1.268∗∗∗ (-5.53) -1.845∗∗∗ (-9.88)
∆ ln IPIt−2 -2.134∗∗∗ (-8.73) -2.179∗∗∗ (-8.91) -2.169∗∗∗ (-7.35) -2.752∗∗∗ (-11.22)
∆ ln IPIt−3 -1.003∗∗∗ (-5.76) -0.995∗∗∗ (-5.68) -0.942∗∗∗ (-5.06) -1.638∗∗∗ (-7.90)
∆ ln IPIt−4 -1.196∗∗∗ (-10.37) -1.231∗∗∗ (-10.33) -1.209∗∗∗ (-7.78) -1.744∗∗∗ (-8.89)
∆ ln IPIt−5 -0.611∗∗∗ (-4.66) -0.634∗∗∗ (-4.60) -0.545∗∗ (-2.59) -1.181∗∗∗ (-5.69)
∆ ln IPIt−6 -0.00116 (-0.01) -0.0114 (-0.12) 0.0892 (-0.58) -0.118 (-0.88)
MA 0.247∗∗ (-2.4) 0.248∗∗ (-2.39) 0.273∗∗ (-2.04)
Tax -0.607∗∗∗ (-6.43) -0.632∗∗∗ (-6.90) -0.674∗∗∗ (-6.82) -0.243∗∗∗ (-3.76)
Q2 0.332∗∗∗ (-7.29) 0.331∗∗∗ (-6.86) 0.364∗∗∗ (-6.39) 0.296∗∗∗ (8.53)
Q3 0.358∗∗∗ (-9.52) 0.362∗∗∗ (-9.24) 0.392∗∗∗ (-10.13) 0.363∗∗∗ (10.91)
Q4 0.442∗∗∗ (-10.53) 0.443∗∗∗ (-10.12) 0.504∗∗∗ (-10.88) 0.381∗∗∗ (10.18)
Constant -0.276∗∗∗ (-8.26) -0.277∗∗∗ (-7.79) -0.310∗∗∗ (-8.61) -0.219∗∗∗ (-7.59)
N 2,857 2,857 2,819 2,613
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents
the estimated coefficients (and the t statistics, of a robust fixed-effects estimation of equa-
tion 20, where B takes the values of the estimated Returns to Scale for each bank at each
point in time. The dependent variable is the growth rate of disbursements. Regression
(1) considers total disbursements (the sum of commercial, consumer and micro-credits
disbursements), regression (2) the sum of consumer and commercial disbursements, re-
gression (3) and (4) consider commercial and consumer disbursements, accordingly.
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Table 15. Lerner Index
Independent Dependent variable ∆ ln yt (disbursements)
variables (1) Total (2) Consumer&Commercial (3) Commercial (4) Consumer
∆ ln yt−1 -0.567∗∗∗ (-15.08) -0.566∗∗∗ (-15.88) -0.568∗∗∗ (-16.65) -0.402∗∗∗ (-7.94)
∆ ln yt−2 -0.420∗∗∗ (-9.99) -0.405∗∗∗ (-10.10) -0.405∗∗∗ (-10.63) -0.295∗∗∗ (-7.02)
∆ ln yt−3 -0.185∗∗∗ (-3.99) -0.183∗∗∗ (-4.18) -0.188∗∗∗ (-4.64) -0.108∗∗ (-2.34)
∆ ln yt−4 -0.186∗∗∗ (-5.90) -0.178∗∗∗ (-6.00) -0.166∗∗∗ (-5.28) -0.204∗∗∗ (-4.47)
∆ ln yt−5 -0.150∗∗∗ (-5.98) -0.141∗∗∗ (-5.90) -0.151∗∗∗ (-4.97) -0.109∗∗∗ (-3.61)
∆rt−1 -10.43∗∗∗ (-5.45) -10.41∗∗∗ (-5.27) -10.26∗∗∗ (-4.86) 33.23∗∗∗ (4.06)
∆rt−2 9.083∗∗∗ (-5.29) 8.963∗∗∗ (-4.96) 7.657∗∗∗ (-4.21) 27.76 (1.22)
∆rt−3 22.62∗∗∗ (-20.58) 22.66∗∗∗ (-20.41) 21.51∗∗∗ (-18.98) 17.85 (1.55)
∆rt−4 -5.173∗∗∗ (-3.74) -5.610∗∗∗ (-3.94) -5.540∗∗∗ (-3.35) -2.216 (-0.20)
∆rt−5 1.073 (-0.42) 1.148 (-0.47) 2.798 (-1.01) -0.784 (-0.03)
∆rt−6 -16.91∗∗∗ (-8.73) -17.06∗∗∗ (-8.90) -16.03∗∗∗ (-6.50) -31.12 (-1.66)
∆LernerIt−1 ∗∆rt−1 14.71∗∗∗ (-11.1) 15.37∗∗∗ (-10.42) 15.05∗∗∗ (-8.5) -33.30∗∗∗ (-3.52)
∆LernerIt−1 ∗∆rt−2 -15.86∗∗∗ (-5.94) -16.23∗∗∗ (-5.85) -15.59∗∗∗ (-5.29) -34.99 (-1.29)
∆LernerIt−1 ∗∆rt−3 -19.20∗∗∗ (-13.71) -19.30∗∗∗ (-13.62) -19.71∗∗∗ (-10.08) -9.369 (-0.66)
∆LernerIt−1 ∗∆rt−4 -3.757∗∗∗ (-2.84) -3.661∗∗ (-2.72) -3.192∗∗ (-2.16) -14.28 (-1.05)
∆LernerIt−1 ∗∆rt−5 11.13∗∗∗ (-4.86) 11.01∗∗∗ (-5.15) 13.10∗∗∗ (-5.34) 9.005 (0.30)
∆LernerIt−1 ∗∆rt−6 10.61∗∗∗ (-5.8) 10.67∗∗∗ (-5.9) 10.32∗∗∗ (-4.32) 27.12 (1.26)
π 7.932∗∗∗ (-3.74) 8.229∗∗∗ (-3.61) 9.242∗∗∗ (-4.35) 2.561 (1.12)
∆ ln IPIt−1 -1.263∗∗∗ (-7.21) -1.214∗∗∗ (-6.81) -1.259∗∗∗ (-5.53) -1.819∗∗∗ (-10.09)
∆ ln IPIt−2 -2.132∗∗∗ (-8.09) -2.181∗∗∗ (-8.26) -2.186∗∗∗ (-6.96) -2.730∗∗∗ (-11.81)
∆ ln IPIt−3 -1.010∗∗∗ (-5.22) -1.007∗∗∗ (-5.19) -0.968∗∗∗ (-4.62) -1.590∗∗∗ (-8.07)
∆ ln IPIt−4 -1.201∗∗∗ (-9.89) -1.234∗∗∗ (-9.72) -1.211∗∗∗ (-7.41) -1.746∗∗∗ (-9.42)
∆ ln IPIt−5 -0.585∗∗∗ (-4.42) -0.610∗∗∗ (-4.44) -0.516∗∗ (-2.43) -1.200∗∗∗ (-5.68)
∆ ln IPIt−6 -0.00295 (-0.03) -0.00782 (-0.09) 0.0939 -0.64 -0.154 (-1.10)
MA 0.242∗∗ (-2.32) 0.243∗∗ (-2.33) 0.268∗ (-2.00)
Tax -0.601∗∗∗ (-6.39) -0.626∗∗∗ (-6.89) -0.666∗∗∗ (-6.78) -0.250∗∗∗ (-3.76)
Q2 0.334∗∗∗ (-7.21) 0.334∗∗∗ (-6.84) 0.370∗∗∗ (-6.42) 0.285∗∗∗ (8.26)
Q3 0.360∗∗∗ (-8.79) 0.365∗∗∗ (-8.57) 0.397∗∗∗ (-9.29) 0.354∗∗∗ (11.05)
Q4 0.443∗∗∗ (-10.05) 0.446∗∗∗ (-9.71) 0.510∗∗∗ (-10.49) 0.370∗∗∗ (10.47)
Constant -0.280∗∗∗ (-7.92) -0.282∗∗∗ (-7.51) -0.318∗∗∗ (-8.31) -0.209∗∗∗ (-7.55)
N 2,860 2,860 2,822 2,606
Note: t statistics in parentheses; ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. This table presents the
estimated coefficients (and the t statistics, of a robust fixed-effects estimation of equation
20, whereB takes the values of the Lerner Index for the loans market. The dependent vari-
able is the growth rate of disbursements. Regression (1) considers total disbursements (the
sum of commercial, consumer and micro-credits disbursements), regression (2) the sum
of consumer and commercial disbursements, regression (3) and (4) consider commercial
and consumer disbursements, accordingly.
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